[sleevi]

Both of those are reasonable concerns, if all other factors were ignored.

However, in practice, the DNS challenge (which demonstrates control over DNS) is greatly preferred over HTTP/TLS challenges (which demonstrate control over a single port).

DNS is likely to be the only way to get a wildcard certificate, and HTTP/TLS will likely end up further restricted once SRVNames in certificates can be gracefully rolled out.

As such, deploying the DNS based control is absolutely the best thing to do, and HTTP/TLS should be seen as legacy-compat fallbacks that may become more difficult in time. Either certificates become less scoped than “entire domain” (as they are today with dNSName SANs) or it becomes more difficult to use a single port to prove authorization for an entire domain.

[sroussey]

But can’t DNS queries be altered man in the middle style?

[sleevi]

I’m not sure your point?

Any HTTP/ALPN request first begins with DNS, so if you’re trying to compare those, they all share the same base issue. In theory, this can be mitigated by DNSSEC, but that’s not relevant when comparing these validation methods.

However, both the HTTP and ALPN methods only demonstrate control over a single port (or .well-known resource), while the DNS method demonstrates the full ability to alter any/all names.

[sroussey]

Actually, I suppose DNS with DNSSEC or DNS over HTTPS would be better than any HTTP method.