[sebmellen]

The results of blockchain-based elections can be checked after the fact, that's true. But if the votes of the individuals in the electorate can be checked after the fact, the system was badly architected. The USPS solution linked by OP does not link the identity of a voter to their blockchain identity, so coercion remains as much of a threat as in postal voting.

Blockchain-based voting systems can be either the least or the most anonymous voting systems. Electronic voting allows the abstraction of many voter-suppression tactics which are still in play in the US.

I may have misjudged the audience, because the postal voting argument is very US centric, at a time when the prevailing media narrative is that postal voting is an essentially infallible system which should not be questioned. I would find it hypocritical if people strongly supported mail-in voting while not considering that blockchain-based voting carries similar advantages and risks (which is why the USPS proposed this, I'm sure).

If you read my other comments in this thread, you'll see I'm not in favor of implementing a blockchain-based voting system yet. I just think the above argument was made from a fundamental misunderstanding of blockchain technology.

[Yetanfou]

> I just think the above argument was made from a fundamental misunderstanding of blockchain technology.

It isn't blockchain which is the problem but wide-spread absentee voting. It doesn't matter whether this is done through mail-in voting, through some blockchain-based app or site, phone-in voting or anything else. The problem is that the person casting the vote can not be assured to do so with privacy and without coercion.

[donaltroddyn]

> I just think the above argument was made from a fundamental misunderstanding of blockchain technology.

Which misunderstanding of blockchains/merkle trees do you believe has caused the argument above to be incorrect?

The system as described in the patent provides no protection that I can see against voter coercion, and in some embodiments, allows a voter to verify that their vote has been counted as cast, which is significantly more ripe for abuse than in-person or even postal voting.

I did read your other comments in this thread, but it seems to me that you have a fundamental misunderstanding of blockchain technology and the problems that it can solve. Your proposed right-to-vote token solution is worse in every way than paper ballots cast in-person at polling stations with private areas, counted by hand in publicly observable count centres.

[sebmellen]

To be clear, most of my other comments in this thread are solutions to problems I took from the top of my head. I'm not suggesting we implement a voting system off of my comments.

I also am not in favor of blockchain-based voting. Of course a "right-to-vote" token is, at the moment, a far worse solution than paper ballots at polling stations. Mostly, this limitation is pragmatic — we don't have good ways to store private keys, low-level hardware and software is not easily auditable, UX/UI issues, etc.

In the US, we are considering having the largest vote-by-mail election ever. This is a politically charged issue, where Trump claims mail-in-voting will lead to massive voter fraud, and the Democratic party claims otherwise. If you suggest that mail-in-voting may be insecure, you're labelled as a Trump supporter.

With this political landscape in mind, electronic voting vs. postal voting is certainly a pertinent discussion. This comes especially as Trump has made efforts to "DDoS" the USPS by kneecapping its throughput. This would, depending on the system's design, be harder to do with electronic voting. Estonia is a good example of how digital voting can be implemented securely, with the approval and understanding of the populous.

But my main contention is that there are ways that blockchain voting can be fully anonymous, even if we don't have the implementation capability right now. Zero-Knowledge proofs, combined with a system where the voter's real identity is never mapped to their on-chain public key, allow for this. The individual voter would receive a private key in the mail, or using a Monero-like blockchain they would generate their private key and redeem one "Right to Vote" token, which would be sent to their account. They would then vote with this token, and using a "view key" would be able to audit that their vote was cast for X party.

Nowhere in this system would real identity be mapped to blockchain identity. The risk of "deanonymization" is therefore about the same as with mail-in voting. A coercer could force you to show them the results of your vote afterwards, true, but there are ways around this as well. Most simply, all view keys could be revoked after casting a vote. The public "token balances" of each candidate would be viewable, but the results of an individual vote not.