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by vjvj 2139 days ago
I like the way the author has articulated this.

It can be built on by applying the economics concept of "externalities" - i.e. side effects (positive or negative) from a particular action such as the exercising of a right or freedom.

To get us closer to a perfect world, we need to start measuring the value of externalities (arguably not always easy to get right but possible to estimate) and to whom this gain or loss in value occurs so that they can be compensated by the externality creator(s).

I agree with the author that most people do not consider the negative externalities of a particular freedom being exercised.

We should require our legislators to more clearly articulate and value externalities from a given policy and identify groups it creates negative externalities for, and how they should be compensated (or why they do not deserve to be compensated).

2 comments

> We should require our legislators to more clearly articulate and value externalities from a given policy and identify groups it creates negative externalities for, and how they should be compensated (or why they do not deserve to be compensated).

That would be identity politics 2.0 and the end of nation states. Not only lawmakers targeting different groups of society to pass legislation, but also identifying (highly subjectively) other groups to be compensated for 2nd and 3rd-order effects introduced by that legislation.

I realize the practical difficulties here, but the actual concept (identifying who's going to be impacted, and offering targeted solutions) sounds like a pretty good idea in theory. Calling it 'identity politics 2.0' is an easy way to dismiss it, but it doesn't respond to the actual argument.
Consider the following situation with parties A, B and C involved. "A" wants to do something that negatively affects B, while C is unaffected. The legislator would decide to compensate B, but who is taxed for that? In case of taxing A and C, C's freedom as a group would be compromised. In case of taxing only A, the cost would be prohibitive and could discourage A from wanting to do its thing in the first place.
Going from this post to your previous post:

> That would be identity politics 2.0 and the end of nation states

Still seems like a massive leap in rhetoric. The truth is that this sort of compensation already exists in the united states. For example: eminent domain, which requires a just compensation for government acquisition of private land. Another example, many cities require some form of compensation from a real estate developer to the surrounding community in exchange for a permit to undergo a big construction; for example, funding a public park or some such.

Neither of these examples seem like "identity politics 2.0" much less the end of nation states. You can argue it's ineffective public policy, but again its a massive leap in rhetoric you took with your earlier post.

> In case of taxing A and C, C's freedom as a group would be compromised.

True. That's why targeted taxes (eg carbon taxing) are often a good idea. However, if we as a society vote to do things that seriously harm a subset of society, then we as a society are partially responsible for that harm.

> In case of taxing only A, the cost would be prohibitive and could discourage A from wanting to do its thing in the first place.

I think it's entirely reasonable to price externalities into the cost of an action.

Then maybe A just shouldn’t do the thing that’s going to harm B to a prohibitive amount?
Inventing the car hurt horse breeders and kicked off global climate change, I don’t think people would argue that their life would be better without the invention of the vehicle.
It's the application of Coase's theorem at the level of the legislature. Nothing "identity" about it; if others are unduly negatively affected by a measure then they deserve compensation.
> We should require our legislators to more clearly articulate and value externalities from a given policy and identify groups it creates negative externalities for, and how they should be compensated (or why they do not deserve to be compensated).

I wonder if this could be a potential remedy for the issue of modern legislation paralysis:

We have lots of modern problems, we often know what are some effective solutions to these problems, and are unable to implement any of them because every solution imposes some kind of externality upon a group with sufficient political power to lobby against it.

For example: building dense housing and public transit in a boom town. It's generally agreed that this is the only sustainable end state (more housing with public transit to offset traffic) and yet we end up with total paralysis on every front: In the rich neighborhoods, nobody wants development to disturb their idyllic suburban life. In the poor neighborhoods, nobody wants a flurry of investment dollars to drive up prices and push out renters. Nobody who drives wants tax dollars on transit, and nobody who uses transit wants tax dollars building more highways. The cycle continues.

To the example: You wouldn't have the necessary democratic legitimization to implement it and I think that is excellent since declaring it the only sustainable end state is very likely wrong. Similar problems within the educational system exist and it is not a completely independent problem to that example.
> You wouldn't have the necessary democratic legitimization to implement it

That's kind of the point of this thread, that perhaps by offsetting externalities at a legislative level, we can help build democratic legitimization to problems that are widely recognized but lacking even incremental solutions.

Obviously you disagree we should even be trying to build more housing or transit, and that's great for you but not really relevant. My post is approaching the issue that there are very large factions of interest groups that collectively do believe we need more housing and transit, but individually cannot agree on where (or should i say, in whose backyard), by whom, and how, it gets built.

I am not against building more housing, on the contrary.

I think the general consideration for this approach is far too narrow. Cities are the least sustainable places humans live in. So the premise is already restricted on properties of the labor market, the main draw for people moving towards cities in the first place. Here the assumption is true, since there are certain requirements for proximity and infrastructure. But I doubt housing policies should be based on that perspective alone.

Especially now, since we noticed that huge parts of the labor force in administrative roles can just as well work remotely. So I believe the perspective to be too narrow. Problems like pollution, congestion, food production, noise and yes, satisfaction are factors that already got externalized before any discussion even began.

I think any housing policies should be mindful of demand, but also examine why the demand exists and if the might be better alternatives. I think many people like "greener pastures" if they weren't forced to compromise with their need for infrastructure.

The founders of the US acknowledged that in a democracy it's possible for the people to be completely wrong about something. That was their entire reasoning for creating an electoral college and for having a senate and house of representatives. They wanted to make sure the electors, senators, and representatives represented the people who elected them, but they acknowledged that sometimes our best interests are only apparent to a sufficiently well-educated body with ample time to become educated on the issue at hand. They recognized that this could be difficult for most people.
Not at all applicable here because these mechanisms are still valid for suggestions like this. The "cities of the future" is a theme that is as old as I can remember and as I said, very likely wrong.

You have these institutions to evaluate the will of voters and implement it as best as they can after careful evaluation.

The paralysis occurs because the political debate revolves around satisfying group interests of affected parties, instead of articulating a "grand vision" which would advance society to a better state, at the cost of temporarily negliging the pure economical interest of more vocal parts of society.