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by blincoln
2143 days ago
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So the attack will then be to hook into the car's on-board computer and tell it to send the falsified message with a fake plate number, and let the existing cryptographic code handle the signing. Alternatively, dump a legit cert once (e.g. by detailed examination of one on-board computer), then put that into the malicious hardware that sends falsified messages. This is "the DRM problem", but in reverse. There is no way to give an end user a device that can send cryptographically-protected messages while also guaranteeing that they can't generate messages other than the ones the manufacturer wants them to send. One can make it very, very hard to do so, like with TPM/trusted enclave hardware, but when the potential consequences are people dying in car crashes, and the motivation to send false messages is so high[1], it's just an awful idea, because it will absolutely be misused, and people will die as a result. Vehicle-to-vehicle communication makes this even worse. At least with a tower intermediary, there would be some sort of forensic evidence stored outside of the vehicles involved. [1] The ability to manipulate traffic in order to get to one's destination faster would be a huge selling point for a lot of people. |
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