[dragonwriter]

> One can lie for multiple reasons. For instance, to avoid conflict; or because one is not in a mood. Deception is one among many reasons.

In all of those cases deception is the purpose of lying, the other purposes described aren't alternatives to deception, they are the purposes for which one seeks to deceive.

It's true that focussing on this has a nexus with Christian moral theory and it's influence on secular morality, since Christian moral theory distinguishes between bad ends sought deliberately as intermediate means to permissible ends and bad ends which are incidental to acts seeking permissible ends.

[raincom]

>In all of those cases deception is the purpose of lying, the other purposes described aren't alternatives to deception, they are the purposes for which one seeks to deceive.

That's what Christian morality says. There are other cultures which don't see the way you see. Western philosophy doesn't even answer the question "Why truth?"; only Nietzsche raises that question.

In Christianity, truth doesn't need any further justification; truth is its own foundation, because God is the Truth. Here the dispute is about how different ways of being in the world; how different cultures are different in different way, not as a variant of the West. Of course, the west thinks that every other culture is a variant of itself; in that sense, your answer is 'acceptable' to the people belonging to the Western culture.

[dragonwriter]

> That's what Christian morality says.

No, it's a simple fact: each of the examples provided is a further end that relies on deception in order for lying to further it, not an alternative end which lying can serve independent of producing deception. Christian (and Christian-derived) morality assigns particular moral significance to that fact, which other cultures might well disagree with.

[ksdale]

FWIW, I agree with you completely.

I think the conversation gets muddled when we start introducing value-laden words like "truth." The crux of the matter for me is, am I lying in order that someone will behave in a way that they wouldn't behave if I told the truth. There are, I believe, good reasons to do this, and undoubtedly, moralities that believe there are never good reasons to do this.

But it is clear (to me anyway) that it is definitely deception, regardless of the justification.

If I'm not trying to get someone to act differently, then there is no deception (and perhaps this is what the other commenter is referring to), though it's hard to imagine a situation where you'd lie without intending to affect someone's behavior, even trivially, like to avoid a conversation with a passerby in the street...

[dasil003]

What you say is true, but stating the fact this way is already framing the conversation. To see this just reflect how you feel when you hear the "deception", it's already a loaded term. Given most of us here grew up indoctrinated in western thought, we're now fighting up-hill to demonstrate a meaningful distinction which eastern cultures take for granted.

[shard]

To deceive someone is to tell them an untruth for personal gain. There are cases where an untruth is told for the greater good, or for the good of the listener. In those cases, there is a divergence between lie and deception.

[ehaliewicz2]

I never got that connotation from the word 'deceive', I thought it just meant misleading someone, not necessarily for your own gain. Furthermore, I grew up christian and was never told all lying was for personal gain.

[shard]

To me there is a difference between mislead and deceive. Deceive has a stronger negative intention behind it. Consider someone saying "I was misled" versus "I was deceived".

I made no connotations between what I wrote and Christianity / all lying is for personal gain, so we can skip that part of the discussion.

[dragonwriter]

> To deceive someone is to tell them an untruth for personal gain.

No, it's to cause someone to believe something that is not true.

Personal gain is a common goal served by deceit, not part of it's essential character.

[shard]

Causing someone to believe something that is not true is too weak of a definition for deceive. Consider the difference between telling someone a falsehood versus deceiving someone. There is a malicious intent behind deception, which is not present in falsehood.

[dragonwriter]

> Causing someone to believe something that is not true is too weak of a definition for deceive

No, it's literally the definition of the word.

> Consider the difference between telling someone a falsehood versus deceiving someone.

The difference is intent; if you don't know that it's false, or you don't intend it to be believed, it's not deception.

> There is a malicious intent behind deception,

It certainly is a matter of intent, but aside from the sense in which a false belief itself is a harm, and any intentional element of harm even if not a net harm is “malice”, I wouldn't say it is necessary malicious.

[raincom]

There are no such things as facts; that's the consensus of the debates in 1960s from history and philosophy of sciences, philosophy of language. Facts are facts of a theory: or, facts are theory-laden. Or observations are theory-laden.

When two parties engage in an argument, some theory-laden facts become facts (for instance, propositional logic in this context is seen as fact), other facts become theoretical claims.

That's the issue here: you call it a 'fact', I call it a theoretical claim. The dispute is at the level of describing the phenomenon itself. If one follows the best theory of argumentation in the market (that of pragma-dialectical school), this way of transforming theory-laden descriptions into facts violates one of the rules of dialogue.

[dragonwriter]

> There are no such things as facts; that's the consensus of the debates in 1960s from history and philosophy of sciences, philosophy of language.

That is itself a fact claim—not just that that is the consensus of the debates in those fields, but even that such debate has occurred is such a claim. So either there are facts (and the conclusion of the debates to the contrary is false) or there are no facts and it makes no sense to cite the supposed debates or their supposed consensus. In either case, the claim about the debates is of no value.

[AnimalMuppet]

Beautiful. Use the claim recursively on itself to destroy it. (And I suspect that all "there is no truth" positions are vulnerable to the same argument.)