[techntoke]

> It's not a good idea. The Chrome sandbox is arguably a lot stronger than Apparmor/ Seccomp. A native program in Apparmor or SELinux can still make virtually arbitrary system calls, whereas an attacker who has compromised a Javascript renderer can not. Further, The attacker would have to own the renderer first, whereas you're talking about just giving native execution rights. Further than that, you can just Apparmor/seccomp chrome? So just go do that? I've done it myself.

In a container sandbox platform, you could still define the permissions that must be granted for a site. Like, this program wants to access your camera, should you let it? Or, it wants to access a directory. That isn't much different than a browser today.

[staticassertion]

It's not much different in its goals, it's just a strictly worse implementation.

[techntoke]

Nothing can be worse than the JavaScript monster we have today