[smart_jackal]

Maybe I'm a bit uninformed but I feel that the whole certification system is quite convoluted and confusing. Couldn't there be a simpler solution of solving the simple trust problem that a user has over the authenticity of a website?

[joveian]

There are technical issues involved and the system has evolved over the years, but part of the issue is that certificate companies make a vast amount of money doing very little and can spend a bunch of money resisting any change to the system that would cut them out of the loop.

IMO, DANE might make sense if DNSSEC wasn't such a mess, although it is a very similar group of parasitic companies involved in DNS. In general, alternative name systems (such as the GNU Name System) could also potentially replace the certificate system and many name and certificate issues are related. Many of the hardest technical issues around certificates relate to revocation and the demonstrated inability of almost anyone to secure anything.

Other options that make a lot of sense in many ways would have govenments or banks involved in identity in a direct way. This is resisted for a varity of reasons.

[_-___________-_]

> if DNSSEC wasn't such a mess

I hear this a lot, but in my experience (managing c. 1000 DNS zones all with DNSSEC enabled, using a strictly DNSSEC-validating resolver for >5 years, and having built DNSSEC infrastructure for DNS hosting providers), it is both reasonably well designed and generally quite well implemented. What is the mess that you perceive?

[tatersolid]

> What is the mess that you perceive?

Not GP, but the mess is near-zero clients and few recursive resolvers are actually doing DNSSEC validation in practice, after 20 years of deployment.

It’s like IPv6.

Also I believe most active ZSKs are actually held and managed by the larger DNS providers on their customers’ behalf. This leads to very little assurance improvement over unsigned records, as credentials to update a web form is all that is needed to “sign” records. There are no real key management requirements for ZSKs as there are with browser CAs.

The only additional assurance provided by a DNSSEC response is that there was likely no MITM between the authoritative server and validating resolver. Which is something, but that problem is more easily and completely solved by DoH which adds privacy as well as authenticity.

[tptacek]

The bigger problem is that none of the browsers support it, or intend to support it. DoH could change that (ironically, the DNSSEC crowd opposes the one DNS change that could offer any chance of viability for DNSSEC), but it's unlikely to.

[_-___________-_]

Well, if the system resolver is doing DNSSEC validation, the browser doesn't need to support it. That's how I've had my system set up for years. Unfortunately, macOS and Windows (other than Server) still don't have any DNSSEC support as far as I'm aware. Support is built in to systemd-resolved now though, which I believe is the default resolver on various Linuxes, and unbound is of course available in all major distros.

[tptacek]

If the goal is to have DNSSEC replace the CAs, then you need DANE, and for DANE to work, browsers have to support it.

[_-___________-_]

That can indeed be a goal, but DNSSEC is useful even without DANE.

[rurban]

Interestingly the GNU Name System IETF draft was just officially filed yesterday: https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-schanzen-gns-01.html

[w3ll_w3ll_w3ll]

I'm afraid the solution cannot be simple, not only because the trust problem is not so simple, but because the nature of the problem is political, not technical. And so the solution must be political (CA/B forum, ballots, convoluted documents, processes for misbehaving entities).