Honestly, this article is fascinating to me for reasons that might discomfit its author.
Not that ignorance of the last 300 years of philosophy on this topic is something necessarily to be ashamed of, but this essay, and the reaction to it here, is of interest to me because (a) this is not an empirically-validated, or even merely well-argued, approach to reasoning about people, but (b) seems to be thought well of anyway, reading the room in this comments section.
I understand better the class of ontological and epistemological elisions system-thinking folks tend not to 'see', and I am reminded of the (now thankfully bygone) era of analytic philosophy where you couldn't make an argument in a respectable journal without translating your propositions into a symbolic logic (your choice of which).
An excellent kettleball to level up with. It's like geocaching but with unsupported assertions.
I fully admit I know nothing of the actual research in psychology/related fields, and this is just my current understanding built up from when I was a kid (completely anecdotal). I'm primarily interested in people's thoughts in general (both good and bad) as well as where I might be able to improve my understanding with the research that's actually been done.
Hm. What if we said that "these preferences exist and theoretically could be mapped to a vector", but also acknowledge that we're impulsive and won't ever actually be able to rigidly identify our own?
"Preferences" here might be more accurately stated as tendencies with some motive.
Honestly, this article is fascinating to me for reasons that might discomfit its author.
Not that ignorance of the last 300 years of philosophy on this topic is something necessarily to be ashamed of, but this essay, and the reaction to it here, is of interest to me because (a) this is not an empirically-validated, or even merely well-argued, approach to reasoning about people, but (b) seems to be thought well of anyway, reading the room in this comments section.
I understand better the class of ontological and epistemological elisions system-thinking folks tend not to 'see', and I am reminded of the (now thankfully bygone) era of analytic philosophy where you couldn't make an argument in a respectable journal without translating your propositions into a symbolic logic (your choice of which).
An excellent kettleball to level up with. It's like geocaching but with unsupported assertions.