[sudhirj]

The problem isn't encryption, let's assume everyone has full disk encryption turned on, so someone who steals your laptop can't access your data.

The problem is that your home directory is accessible to a ton of apps on your computer, and you have no idea what each of them is doing with that access. You also have no idea if any of them can be / are being exploited. The most recent case being Zoom – if that server they had running on localhost and responding to anyone on the laptop had file system access APIs (which is reasonable if Zoom had offered file sharing on calls) an attacker would have been able to read all your credentials.

[Bnshsysjab]

If you have an app on your computer that is controlled remotely you have _massive_ issues. Creds are stored for SSH, browser, probably heaps of other things too. If this is a serious security concern within your threat model you should be auditing every single package or isolating (docker, vms, Bare metal if you’re super tin foiled), anything short of that is fake security.

[txcwpalpha]

>Creds are stored for SSH, browser, probably heaps of other things too.

And ideally these credentials should have similar controls applied around them as well (only temporary, using passwords to unlock the SSH keys, etc). If you don't have that, that's your choice, but just because some of your credentials lack security controls is not a reason for other credentials to lack security controls, too.

> you should be auditing every single package or isolating (docker, vms, Bare metal if you’re super tin foiled), anything short of that is fake security.

Which is exactly the reason that many orgs do specifically audit every package and disallow unapproved software. But again, even if some of your desktop apps are allowed unaudited, that is not reason to lessen your security elsewhere.

[Bnshsysjab]

There’s a very limited set of scenarios where local file read isn’t accompanied by enough write/exec privilege to inject a keylogger. Sir, there might be some cases where the control would prevent abuse but they’re limited. IMO time/money should be invested in other security over anything more unless you’re literally nearing an absolutely secure environment. In most cases I’ve seen there’s gaping holes while crazy amounts of time and money are spent securing something that doesn’t actually improve overall security much or at all.

[thayne]

In that case, the rogue app would have access to your temporary credentials anyway...

[txcwpalpha]

Yes, and of course that is bad, but it is not as bad as a rogue app having access to infinite life credentials.