[beders]

E2E is an illusion on anything other than a free Linux running on a free BIOS with no security enclave.

You can't have E2E on mobile devices, you can't have E2E on any other OS. (And you'll probably have a hard time finding the right combination of hardware and Linux distro to have it on Linux)

[akerl_]

This seems to pick an arbitrary expansion of what “end to end” means, where “end” is “the OS layer on the source/destination computers”.

What if the monitor is backdoored and sends copies of the display buffer to The Secret World Government? What if the keyboard has a hardware keylogger? What if we’re all living in an elaborate computer simulation of a global pandemic?

As an alternate comparison: it’s still end-to-end encrypted communication if I take the securely received message, print out a copy, and tape it to a bulletin board at the town square.

The “end-to-end” refers to the transmission path. It’s a defense against MITM, and can be accomplished by plenty of systems that aren’t Linux.

[beders]

Yes, I understand perfectly what is is.

But people attribute security properties to it that it doesn't have!

What good is protection against MITM if I can just read it off your device while you type it?

You have no security with mobile devices. It is foolish to think so.

[akerl_]

I feel like you meant the question to be rhetorical, but for the sake of clarifying: there is tremendous value in protecting against MITM, even if there remain other attack vectors.

Encrypting traffic end-to-end over the network protects against entire categories of attack. For some attackers (for example: ISPs), end-to-end encryption essentially removes their ability to compromise traffic contents. For other attackers, it forces them to ignore those categories of attack and instead narrows them to things like compromising the device. Notably, Linux is not magically immune to device compromise, even if you’re running a magical open-source BIOS. And unlike Windows/OSX, Linux doesn’t have Apple/Microsoft paying large, motivated security teams whose work is pushed to all their devices. At best, Linux has commercial distro providers like RedHat paying for security work. At worst, it relies on the good will and skill sets of open source maintainers. In trade, Apple/Microsoft offer lower customizability/visibility into the OS. But since the average user is not interested in (or qualified to do) security hardening of devices, Linux isn’t likely to buy them anything meaningful in the field of device security.

All of this is to say “life is hard. We shouldn’t make it harder by protesting the concept of E2E encryption due to the obvious fact that it does not cure all ailments.”

[beders]

Just in case you don't get it:

The moment the information is unencrypted and made available via a userinterface, you've lost all control.

You don't control the iOS rendering loop. You don't control the Android rendering system. (You might think you do though as much of Android is open source).

You don't control the OS core libraries, you don't control the microcode of the CPU. You don't control the blitting to a screen device or the recording of photons on a camera. And I'm not even talking about external manipulation to exfiltrate data.

You might control the content of the IP packages sent. You don't control any other IP packages sent.

[lostmsu]

You forgot that somebody can snoop on the unencrypted image on your screen.

[millstone]

E2E is a property of the software, not the software license.

[beders]

Yeah, even that is not true. Do you know what Apple does with text you enter into a text field? Or the letters you type on a virtual keyboard? It's closed source and even if it were open source, you have no way of checking if the binary has been produced by that source code.

You don't control anything.

[millstone]

I agree, I don't control any of that.

But E2E is a technical property of a system. It's not a social property regarding who controls what.

[UweSchmidt]

Any specific software and hardware that qualifies or comes close?

[beders]

I really don't know which firmware nowadays qualifies as secure i.e. without backdoors.

The times where we had complete control over our hardware seem to be over.

Would also like to know about the current state of Open Hardware.