[wsxcde]

When I clicked the link, I figured this would be a research paper from MIT. It took me a bit of reading to figure out it was just a student project report. That's why I posted the GP.

I stand by my comment that there doesn't appear to be anything particularly novel about this work. Especially with crypto it is important to stick with well-studied and well-understood primitives. There's a danger that someone looks at this and assumes it is being endorsed by MIT and implements it in their system.

[mdxn]

This is a misapplication of that principle and runs the risk of turning into the toxic gatekeeping that I know first hand has kept many talented people out of the academic cryptography community. The authors of this work implement their system using existing proof of concept zkSNARK libraries that have been developed by researchers studying this area for roughly a decade or more. They are not rolling their own crypto and are guided by top notch cryptography researchers at MIT (albeit in a course setting).

Even supposing that there is a dangerous time to experiment with application with proof of concept work, this really isn't the case for zero-knowledge proof (or more specifically, zk-SNARK) systems right now. I have been in this field for many years and the chief complaint that I have heard many researchers have is that the tooling exists, yet people are not making heavy usage of it outside of ZCash. This, thankfully, has become less true within the last year or two. This work, even if it is written by students, is nice to see given this reality and can give researchers trying to optimize these development tools necessary feedback to improve them.

To put this into a larger research context, keep in mind that various funding agencies have probably spent at least $1 billion on FHE, ZKP, and similar novel crypto research in the last decade. Off the top of my head, this includes DARPA, ONR, NSF, and many more. The biggest barrier this area currently faces is fine tuning these tools to be performant and accessible to non-research level security engineers and developers. This includes determining which applications this technology may be useful for and where, if applied, it is surprisingly not useful. This is why there are continuing (multi-million $) programs to directly target these problems (DARPA SIEVE and IARPA HECTOR for example). This work by MIT students is, at least on the surface, a potentially useful datapoint that we can use to inform our decisions going forward (I personally would like to know more about their development experience using the tools).

[wsxcde]

Your point about the need to "popularize" zk-snarks etc. is well-taken and I upvoted you for it.

But that said, we seem to be talking past each other at this point. I don't see why my criticism of the OP was unconstructive. This is not actually a research paper, it has not undergone any sort of academic peer review, and if the goal is to present it as one example of the kinds of things that are possible to build with zkSNARKs, then it ought to be presented in that context.

I do want to note that it is possible to compose zkSNARKs in an application in ways that result in the composition not being zero-knowledge. Not saying that has happened here, but implying there's no danger with incorrect usage of zkSNARKs seems sketchy to me.