[omazurov]

> In this post I haven’t really provided any references, but hopefully in future I’ll do short posts explaining where these ideas came from.

One such reference might be "Strong and Weak Emergence" by David Chalmers [0], given the fact that "weak" emergence was introduced but "strong" emergence was not even mentioned (though indirectly implied).

[0] http://www.consc.net/papers/emergence.pdf

[raincom]

Philosophical theses need empirical support. The biggest issue wrt emergence is "downward causation". If there is strong emergence, it is going to be ontologically different: that's why it is ontological mergence.

As a consequence, this new entity has to function as a causal agent. Otherwise, why populate the world with entities that don't work as causal agents. Upward causation is consistent with both ontological and epistemic emergence. Downward causation is consistent with epistemic emergence. Are there examples of ontological emergence that can play a role in downward causation?

Until then, it is all unbounded philosophical speculation. These speculations get bounded (constrained) by empirical sciences.

[glenstein]

And to take your argument just one step further: physics operates on causal closure, and I don't know how proponents of emergentism reconcile it with causal closure.

[raincom]

One of the toys philosophers use to explain away anything is to divide/classify. If there is an issue with X, make a distinction between strong-X and weaker-X. First, it is strong emergence (ontic) vs. weaker emergence (epistemic). Later, it is "strong" downward causation vs. "weaker" downward causation.

This endless subdivision is a pass time.