[JackRabbitSlim]

This is pretty much it. Let's frame the proposition differently to get people to consider it from a new perspective.

I can verify the OS install media with trusted publishes using signing keys and PKI. I can't do a god damn thing about the cheap, back-doored PCI controller from China.

What protection does secure boot really offer the end user at that point? The PCI controller is in place to just pass the right signatures to secure boot or just wait until after the secure boot checks so it's not helping with bad hardware. I already verified the OS media at install, so its not super useful there either. Did my boot code change? How would I know? Did the bad PCI controller fake it? Do I have any additional trust in my system? I can't go probing the system to try to find out.

A black box with zero control told you you were safe and there is no way to look at or modify the system now so you can trust it. Your hardware was never on a TAO workbench. Who doesn't feel safer?

[mjg59]

> I can't do a god damn thing about the cheap, back-doored PCI controller from China.

Of course you can - that's what IOMMUs are for.