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by lekanwang
2268 days ago
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I think you are perhaps conflating the public health definition of surveillance with what HN usually thinks of as "surveillance." (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_health_surveillance) In the US, if you get certain reportable illnesses (COVID-19, E.coli infection, meningitis, etc), it's reported to the county/state health department, and via various channels, ends up anonymized with the CDC. Likewise, there are syndromic and lab-based public health surveillance networks that will monitor flu-like symptoms (ILINet) and will sequence samples (PulseNet) to help track cases in the US. Moreover, there's even more public health surveillance when it comes to drug safety -- if you tell your physician that you got any of a number of side effects from a drug you're taking, that is reportable to the FDA (FAERS). What Gottlieb et al are asking for is merely extending the best practices we have from flu, foodborne, and other diseases to COVID-19, in a way that has proven extremely effective, and also preserving privacy and liberty. I think many of us here are rightfully concerned about an increasing surveillance state, but the term "surveillance" here is an unfortunate term collision, and we should resist the knee-jerk reaction in this case. |
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What is being proposed from a public health surveillance perspective is reliant on a multifold and invasive surveillance state data collection and mining perspective.