[TeMPOraL]

> Being honest, I don't think there is any need for such alarmism.

Looks at JHU map... I think there is.

> If anything, this pandemic has demonstrated that a viral bioweapen could ensure MAD just as well as the nuclear variety.

A viral bioweapon is like trying to enact MAD by being the only ones with nukes and threatening to nuke everyone including yourself unless others do as you wish. It's a domain of mad men.

> You are implying that individuals could release a bioweapon upon the world - sorry, but again I think this is pure alarmism, and absolutely not what we need right now.

I'm implying that small groups could do it now, and individuals perhaps a decade for now. Biohacking has been a thing for a while now, and the main limiting factor is still that a) most people are sane, b) this is still difficult and you're more likely to give yourself diarrhea than weaponize a pathogen.

> I don't doubt that the WHO and experts from across the globe will be making plans to more rapidly contain future outbreaks. I'm certainly interested to learn more about such plans when they exist though.

Contact tracing seems like a no-brainer here. Great payoff for relatively little effort.

[GordonS]

> Looks at JHU map... I think there is.

Sorry, "JHU"?

> A viral bioweapon is like trying to enact MAD by being the only ones with nukes and threatening to nuke everyone including yourself unless others do as you wish. It's a domain of mad men.

Maybe I misunderstood you then - you said "the one after that purposeful". Based on your latest comment, I guess this was in relation to small groups or individuals, not governments.

> Contact tracing seems like a no-brainer here. Great payoff for relatively little effort

OK, we have common ground here :) I fully agree that contact tracing is essential when a new and dangerous virus is discovered. Where I think we differ is the means to that end.

[TeMPOraL]

> Sorry, "JHU"?

Johns Hopkins University, in particular their map here:

https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.h...

> I guess this was in relation to small groups or individuals, not governments.

Yup, I meant primarily small groups. Coarse-level bioweapons have bad payoff for governments - they're as likely to harm the attacker as the target. A targeted weapon, hurting only a specific group of people, would be more useful for a government, but it's still risky business - pathogens tend to mutate rather fast. I'm more worried about the crazy people that have a grudge and/or a point to make, and no regard for their own safety.

> Where I think we differ is the means to that end.

It's really, really hard to do contact tracing without some form of surveillance / keeping track of people's whereabouts. Systems that could streamline existing data collection end up giving similar data to what this app would.

[GordonS]

> Johns Hopkins University, in particular their map here

OK, we're fully agreed that covid-19 is extremely serious, my disagreement is your belief that biological warfare is readily available to small groups or individuals.

[Reelin]

> my disagreement is your belief that biological warfare is readily available to small groups or individuals

As a counterexample, have you considered that much of the cutting edge biological research takes place in academic labs? The vast majority of those would fit the definition of a small group, and many of the projects they undertake are conducted by only one or two individuals. The level of expertise required and difficulty of learning the material are the main barriers to entry for outsiders.

[Reelin]

I hate to be the bearer of bad news, but the discovery of CRISPR a few years ago means that gene drives are more accessible than ever. I'm not sure if it will be feasible to defend against them at all for the foreseeable future.

[TeMPOraL]

All the more reasons for being able to deploy swift and heavy biosafety measures at a moment's notice. But I didn't want to go into that territory, because a) I don't want to sound too alarmist, and b) I'm not very confident about what is vs. what isn't possible with CRISPR-based workflows in terms of bioweapons.

[kazinator]

> A viral bioweapon is like trying to enact MAD by being the only ones with nukes and threatening to nuke everyone including yourself unless others do as you wish.

Someone with a viral bioweapon will develop it together with a vaccine. They will let only their people and allies have the vaccine, ensuring it is distributed secretly ahead of time, and wipe out everyone else.

Or possibly use it for blackmail: surrender everything to us, and those of you still left alive will be spared.

[TeMPOraL]

I'm worried that bioweapons at present levels of technology/understanding of science are just too risky for sane people to deploy. Even if a vaccine was paired with a pathogen, the risk of mutation making the vaccine irrelevant is too high.

Therefore, I'd expect one to be developed by some suicidal crazies with a grudge, who also won't have a particular need for a vaccine.