[gruez]

>> Hardware IDs will be forged

>Seems like a victory for privacy. Who wants to be tracked via hardware IDs?

Those are probably not the hardware ids you're thinking about. They're the hardware ids used in trusted computing (eg. remote attestation, TPM sealing), not the ones used for fingerprinting.

>People actually rely on proprietary hardware encryption? They should have learned the lesson when built-in SSD encryption turned out to be worthless.

This is a very naive take on what's at stake. With disk encryption, there's the risk of an evil maid attack (where the attacker replaces the bootloader with a malicious one and intercepts your key next time it boots). One way of preventing this is by using trusted computing to ensure that the encryption keys are only released when the system is at a known good state (ie. bootloader hasn't been tampered with). This applies to both proprietary solutions (bitlocker) and free ones (tpm-luks).