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by yqx
2296 days ago
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> "It all boils down to this philosophical question: Are humans special? Do they have parts of their brain predestined to become these special things?" Livingstone says. "Or can we explain it using low-level principles we’ve inherited from lower animals?" I found this remark by Margaret Livingstone, quoted in the article, very surprising. What if anything does innate functional specialization have to do with whether "humans are special"? How does the presence of such specialization distinguish us from "lower animals"? Perhaps the reasoning goes that what might make humans special is the presence of human-specific innate specialized brain mechanisms. But while not everyone might agree, I tend to think the difference may be more related to subtle neuro-anatomical differences (such as number of neurons) rather than the presence of specialized "brain modules". We know brains are highly context sensitive and plastic, and judging by Livingstone's earlier quote, she agrees. So why is the charged question of human exceptionalism (which she already seems to accept given the reference "lower animals") suddenly linked so strongly to the presence of innate specialization? |
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What makes humans special among mammals, other than our big brains, is that we're very good at learning from each other. A 2 year old human isn't really much better at solving mechanical puzzles than a 2 year old monkey but that human is a positive genius at social learning compared to the monkey. And once that human learns a word like "or" they can start applying the disjunctive syllogism in ways a monkey will never match. A large plastic brain probably limits how smart a human can get but it's seemingly hardwired traits like an infants preferences for learning from people with accents similar to their mothers that kickstart humans. See Joseph Henrich's work.