[upofadown]

Opinionated is great as long as it allows for future backwards compatibility. This sort of thing is critical for things like this that depend on cryptography. There has to be a way to support the old thing at the same time as the new thing when it looks like the old thing might eventually have to be swapped out. There has to be a way to do the transition.

[tptacek]

This is the opposite of what cryptography engineers believe today.

[upofadown]

Which ones? How do they suggest that cryptographic upgrades occur?

[jandrese]

In the cryptography world backwards compatibility is basically "let the adversary switch me back to the old and busted protocol so I can be owned even after I upgraded to the latest version."

[tptacek]

Or, in the DROWN case, ricochet the new protocol off the old protocol to use individual elements of the old protocol to break the new one.

[upofadown]

Most required upgrades do not involve anything "busted". Weaknesses are often noticed long before any practical attacks are available. If you want to upgrade, say, Wireguard in such a case you would have to switch over the endpoints in pairs. Obviously that is going to be impossible in practice so the system will get backward compatibility grafted on in a fragile and dangerous way.

OpenPGP is an example of a case where relatively extreme backwards compatibility is required as old archived messages have to be accessible. But that isn't a problem because things are such that downgrade attacks are impossible. The list of desired methods is in the public key which is signed with itself. So downgrades are not always an issue.

[pvg]

You can straight up google 'pgp' and 'downgrade attack' so maybe that's not that great an example.

[upofadown]

Do you have an actual example? Normally when people talk about a downgrade attack on OpenPGP they just assume it is somehow possible without actually checking that it is.

Note that I am only claiming that downgrade attacks are technically impossible for OpenPGP due to the way that it works. To break the protection against downgrades means that you have to break the root cryptography. That might not be true for other stuff... Makes for a great example though...

[dsr_]

Something like this:

We introduce wireguard2, which is not wire-protocol-compatible with original wireguard. The same configuration files can be used, but you must generate new keys as part of your switch over.

We strongly advise you to stop using original wireguard if there is any possibility of a wealthy, organized, determined attacker intercepting your communications. (See CVE2021-x. and forthcoming paper "64 qubits can deduce Curve25519 points" by D.J. Bernstein et al.)

[upofadown]

So at midnight July 23 2026 everyone upgrades to wireguard2 all at once? Perhaps I am not getting what you are proposing here...

[tptacek]

Just like with TLS and its "ciphersuites", you expose the vulnerable components for as long as (1) you're required to by your users and (2) the risk is bearable. At some point, you stop exposing the vulnerable component at all. Ciphersuite negotiation doesn't free you from this requirement, but it does make it harder to ensure that peers who agree on non-vulnerable parameters are actually able to use them.

None of this is complicated. It's also worth looking back on the history of TLS vulnerabilities to get a sense of just how little ciphersuite negotiation helped anybody.

[upofadown]

My understanding is that Wireguard has no way to do anything other than what it does now. There is no way to use an upgrade in the protocol.

[afiori]

not everyone, only a single network at a time. a common use will be corporate VPNs or VPNs on digital ocean-like services, in that case there is little to no reason for interoperability between two distinct network.

or at least you might want different keys anyway