[dropoutcoder]

In that case you would not be forced, at least in a more extreme application of the word.

Regarding ethics, my opinion is that it’s unethical to offer strong E2EE to the masses at scale, without considering the needs of LE.

[CKN23-ARIN]

LE in which jurisdiction(s)? If the E2EE is widely used, the "needs" of local LE will be varied and often contradictory.

[JoshTriplett]

This is one of many excellent arguments against such backdoors. The US would like backdoors into everyone's communications, and doesn't want anyone else to have them. China would like backdoors into everyone's communications, and doesn't want anyone else to have them. Every country and jurisdiction would like backdoors into everyone's communications, and doesn't want anyone else to have them.

[dropoutcoder]

In America, our govt

[tbyehl]

Why should Law Enforcement have a seat at the table in the design of anything?

Should my sneakers be made more uncomfortable so I can't run away too fast?

Should they be able to remotely disable my car?

Remotely open the blinds to my home's windows?

Should I not be able to install a front door that resists attempts at forced entry?

What's the line where Law Enforcement's wants merit consideration?

[dropoutcoder]

If it comes to pass that the department of justice insists on implementation of Exceptional access it would be who’ve the civil libertarians to work towards a better compromise. Hedge your bets.

[tbyehl]

So, I failed to actually state what I was trying to probe from you:

Why do you view it as unethical to not consider Law Enforcement needs wrt strong end-to-end encryption?

[dropoutcoder]

Having exceptional access is important to keeping and improving society. It’s unethical to ignore and fight LE’s ongoing needs regarding such access. E2EE at scale, unchecked, is an extreme viewpoint with trade offs that I consider unethical at best, and fundamentally dangerous at worst.

[JoshTriplett]

You haven't explained why, you're just re-asserting what the comment you replied to was expecting you to explain.

[dropoutcoder]

I did

[unionpivo]

As someone from ex comunist/socialist state, I am completely fine with LE not having too much power. I think them being able to break all encryption in use is way too much power. Its not if, it's when it will be abused, and how many people die for it. And LE's can do a lot more damage than all terrorist combined.

[dropoutcoder]

Thanks for that. The goal is to design a system that prevents abuses. A technological solution to the ape problem would be helpful.

[JoshTriplett]

Current systems prevent most abuses, and many people are working on improving it to prevent more abuses.

As an excellent example, Certificate Transparency has almost completely mitigated the potential abuse of compromising a certificate authority and using it to MITM traffic. Similarly, "binary transparency" or "software transparency" will hopefully eliminate the abuse of delivering a "special binary" to just one person that others have not received.

Part of the threat model is the belief that any system with a backdoor has any hope of "preventing abuses". The backdoor is the abuse, leaving aside all the misuses of it that will happen.

[dropoutcoder]

Minimize or eliminate misuse through fundamental rethink of the solution.