[m4rtink]

Can one really trust they don't store more if they physicaly have the information at one point in time ? Or possibly their upstream connectivity provider could do that metadata scrapping.

[josh2600]

I will link to this each and every time this comes up:

https://signal.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/

Signal turned over everything they had on this user (which was two time stamps: user creation and last access), and fought the gag order to be able to publish the subpoena and the response. Signal would have to be pretty stupid to lie to a federal court.

Think what you want, but Signal doesn’t have any metadata to turn over.

[DrScientist]

If I worked for the intelligence agencies I would be capturing all the info going in and out of the signal servers at the infrastructure level.

Even if I couldn't break the encryption I'd have timing and connectivity data.

So, if I were a user, I would always operate on the assumption that info would leak.

[Forbo]

In this threat model, the only defense you would have would be an overlay network resistant to correlation attacks where all nodes are involved in routing traffic (like I2P), or a mixnet like Katzenpost.

Getting people to use Tor for everything is hard enough, good luck getting people to use stuff even more obscure.

[hans_castorp]

And how often where the silenced by US law and weren't even allowed to mention such a thing? We will never know.