[claudiawerner]

It also raises questions on the nature of consent, agency, and responsibility in the case of an addicted person who continues their addictive behaviour (with interesting answers depending on whether the person is willingly or unwillingly addicted). It is not a settled question in philosophy to answer that an addict has all the agency (especially to be "informed as to the risks") as others[0].

[0] "There is certainly widespread agreement about the paradigm threats to personal autonomy: brainwashing and addiction are the favorite examples in the philosophical literature. But philosophers seem unable to reach a consensus about the precise nature of these threats. They cannot agree about how it is that certain influences on our behavior prevent us from governing ourselves." From: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personal-autonomy/

[amanaplanacanal]

Cause and effect rule all things. We are formed by genetics, experiences in childhood, all of our trauma, and whether we were born rich or poor. It’s not obvious to me that addiction or brainwashing are different in kind from all of the other influences we are exposed to.

[claudiawerner]

Traditionally, following Harry Frankfurt, volitions can be separated into two camps: first-order and second-order. First order volitions are things you just want (such as food). Second order volitions are things you want to want. Someone who only has first-order desires can be said to have no free will. Addiction (and especially brainwashing) are a detriment to second-order desires in that they limit your self-control and take over the second-order desires.

Not all addictions are the same, and the fact that some people are able to stop their addictions attests to that. But they are definitely in a "meta" category of desire which childhood experiences and genetics are not.

>Consider first the unwilling addict, who is someone that has both a first-order desire to take the drug, and a first-order desire not to take the drug. Crucially, however, the unwilling addict also has a second-order volition that her first-order desire to take the drug not be her will. This is the basis for her unwillingness. Regrettably, her irresistible addictive desire to take the drug constitutes her will. Next, consider the case of the willing addict. The willing addict, like the unwilling addict, has conflicting first-order desires as regards taking the drug to which she is addicted. But the willing addict, by way of a second-order volition, embraces her addictive first-order desire to take the drug. She wants to be as she is and act as she does.

>It is now easy to illustrate Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory of free will. The unwilling addict does not take the drug of her own free will since her will conflicts at a higher level with what she wishes it to be. The willing addict, however, takes the drug of her own free will since her will meshes with what she wishes it to be.