[nullc]

HTTPS certs provide extraordinary limited security in any case, there is no need to single out lets encrypt.

If you can receive a http request destined to the target domain (e.g. via MITM near the real target, DNS hijacking, or route hijacking, or MITM near a CA) then you can get a cert issued for that domain by pretty much any popular CA.

With security so limited what would be the purpose of compromising lets encrypt?

[nullc]

Massive downvotes but no responses.

Is it because you accept that the security provided by HTTPS is limited but don't like people calling that out?

It's better than nothing. But it is my perspective that as technical experts any time we are not absolutely frank about the limitations of the current model against powerful MITM attackers we are behaving unethically.

There is absolutely no reason for any major state attacker to compromise letsencrypt. Beyond the weaknesses I enumerated above state actors have their own CAs which are accepted by browsers and pinning is effectively dead ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning#Browse... ).

What exactly could a state actor hope to accomplish by compromising letsencrypt that they couldn't already do more easily and stealthily?