[tsimionescu]

The GP's point was that, if the bar for the 5th amendment is that you may be required to provide testify against yourself as long as the government already knows the piece you are required to testify about, it's not clear how that wouldn't apply to you being required to admit your guilt when the government has sufficient evidence that you are guilty.

I'd also note that giving the government your books is required by financial laws as a condition do being allowed to do business, it's not testimony or your general obligation of cooperating with an investigation.

[wahern]

Generally speaking, any non-testimonial evidence entered into court must be backed by a witness testifying to the nature, content (e.g. literally reciting the incriminating parts), and origins of the evidence. And that person has to have had a proper relationship to the evidence to do so, which is usually the person with the most direct and close relationship to an item or act. For example, if you want to enter verbal statements into evidence, the best and proper person to testify to them is usually the person who made the statement, not a listener.

Another way to look at it is that the only real evidence in court is witness testimony; everything else is just window dressing. Thus we have the Fifth Amendment: "[no person] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

How does that get turned into a rule that a defendant can't be forced to divulge information outside court? Because to be admissible in court such information would normally require the defendant to be a witness. If it's not admissible then there's no legitimate basis for the state to compel an act. That leads to two corollaries: 1) if the person isn't a defendant, or is given immunity, he would never be required to be a witness against himself (just a witness against someone else), and thus the Fifth Amendment isn't implicated; 2) if the evidence obtained from the information would be admissible without the defendant's testimony, the Fifth Amendment likewise isn't implicated.

#2 is the case here. Because the government can already show ownership of the hard drives through other witness testimony (e.g. testimony of a relative, purchase receipts, etc), it would be categorically unnecessary for the defendant to testify in court to the incriminating act of divulging the password. However, if for some reason it later turned out that the government couldn't show ownership independently, then of course the hard drives would be inadmissible; not because of the forced password disclosure, per se, but simply because the defendant himself couldn't be compelled to be a witness to his act of divulging the password--an investigator couldn't testify that the defendant disclosed the password as that would be hearsay.[1] But such a turnaround is rare as a court won't compel disclosure unless it's clear there's ample independent and admissible evidence of ownership.

[1] There are lots of exclusions and exceptions to hearsay, especially regarding defendant admissions, but they're disallowed if they would effectively nullify the spirit of the Fifth Amendment if permitted for compelled acts. If you're a strict textualist, as most conservative-leaning people believe themselves to be, then one would presumably be okay with permitting those exceptions, particularly those exceptions which existed at the time of ratification of the Fifth Amendment.

[throwaway17_17]

I have a very strong suspicion that most of the Circuit courts are not going to follow this analysis. Based on the continual erosion of individual applicability of the 4-6 amendments, I would say the more like argument and opinions will focus on distinguishing these types of cases (forced decryption) from testimonial precedent. They will then proceed to, or try to, align the context with the clearly allowable compelling of DNA, fingerprints, physical appearance and other visual identifiers.

I don’t particularly like that train of thought, but given (for example) the higher court’s willingness for the sentence “I want a lawyer, dawg” to be a request for canine companionship and not one asserting a 6th amendment right to counsel, I don’t think I’m wrong.

[wahern]

Maybe I'm misunderstanding you, but my analysis justifies the legitimacy of forced disclosure, at least in similar situations [EDIT: as I assumed]. And that's exactly why I agree with you that eventually the rule will be firmly established that forced disclosure of passwords is lawful.

I think some courts have been squeamish about forced disclosure, sometimes because they hold a more liberal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that relies on broader principles, sometimes because the situation is often far more complex and uncertain (if not completely incomparable to the hypothetical context I relied on) and they rightly err on the side of protecting the defendant's rights.

In this [EDIT: hypothetical] case I believe this analysis is the correct one, not just because of the text but also the purpose and history of the Fifth Amendment. It's not the proper vehicle to push other principles and legal theories that would restrict such forced disclosure. I lean rather liberal when it comes to constitutional interpretation, but at the same time rights built on sand aren't rights you can rely on. The law in this area seems muddy and precarious precisely because the liberal narrative is too incoherent. (Note: The liberal narrative in this case--that forced disclosure of a password is categorically barred, notwithstanding the intricacies of the rules of evidence--isn't politically partisan. Thus my subtle dig at contemporary conservative constitutional interpretation, which is often incoherent itself.)

EDIT: To be clear, in the case discussed in the article almost everything is more complicated than the simple hypothetical. I was responding at a point in this thread where the discussion already had become abstract.

[throwaway17_17]

I think we are agreeing on the end result, I was just suggesting that I don’t think the courts are going to be keen delve into 5th amendment intricacies and how speech may be compelled. I was just offering what I think will be the path of least resistance in the opinions in this area. I think your argument and reasoning is sound, I just think the courts are going to dodge any discussion of that by deciding prematurely that this area is like DNA(in the context of forced blood draws) and just rule, punting on the reasoning you put forward.

An unecessary personal detail: I wouldn’t describe myself as leaning liberal on constitutional interpretation (although all my Writs would lead one to assume I am firmly in favor of it), I certainly see myself as a die hard centrist in this area.

[sjy]

This doesn’t sound right to me. As you point out, admissions are an exception to the hearsay rule. They are routinely admitted as evidence in cases where the defendant later retracts the admission and pleads not guilty. There is no Fifth Amendment violation or calling of the defendant as a witness for the prosecution.

I have never seen any authority for the view that the Fifth Amendment was intended literally to prevent the accused from being called as a prosecution witness at trial, as opposed to creating a general privilege against self-incrimination. For example, in Brown v. Walker (1896) [1], an early Fifth Amendment case, the Supreme Court said:

> the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim which, in England, was a mere rule of evidence became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.

[1]: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/161/591/