| I am by no means an expert on this area of the law, but I think this is a really interesting topic that I tried to explore in a recent dissertation. I think the issues come from the fact that copyright law really fails to represent the realities of creativity in humans. As you point out, the laws don't really address the fact that often the things we create are based on all of our experiences and consumption of creative works, yet a machine which can produce the same process may fall foul of the exclusive rights of reproduction and adaptation. Is it merely the fact that humans have consciousness which means that we are able to do this without violating copyright law? At least in the US there is more flexibility around derivitive works, which give creators of derivitive works some avenue to enforce exclusive rights over their creations, or at least avoid claims from original rights holders. Here in the UK we really lack such a flexibility, with the only exceptions along the same lines being 'fair dealing' which is not really a fair comparison because it requires the derivative creator to jump through a bunch of hoops. Having said that, I'm not sure derivative works are really a suitable legal definition for AI created works, but until we can have a conversation about the role of originality and creativity and the role of consciousness in those proesses, this imperfect definition will probably continue to be applied to those works. Lawrence Lessig writes a lot about this sort of thing, if you are interested. EDIT: Also the academic Omri Rachum-Twaig recently wrote a book called 'Copyright Law and Derivative Works: Regulating Creativity' which also covers a lot of issues that are interesting, such as the disconnect between the psychology of creativity and the structure of copyright law. |