You do realize your isp knows you visited a domain like wikipedia. The only thing private is the page content which can be gotten by visiting your request.
That isn't news to me, and it does not undermine my point. Again: A snooping ISP should not be able to tell whether a customer has been looking up an embarrassing medical condition.
Someone going on Wikipedia tells you relatively little. Knowing which specific pages they've been reading, tells you a great deal more.
HTTPS goes a long way to preventing a snooping ISP from telling which page you visited. A truly committed ISP might still be able to infer it from the traffic patterns, but they'll have a much harder time than with plaintext HTTP.
With a very large property like Wikipedia it's probably unavoidable that it'll be possible to determine that you contacted Wikimedia, even just from IP addresses. If that's too much you'll need TOR.
But far from "the only thing" being page content, almost everything is "kept private" with HTTPS, the request itself including any body provided, and the response to that request.
So while "visiting your request" might well get them their own copy of the content of a particular encyclopedia page you looked at, they're stuck with not knowing what that request was.
And eSNI plus DPRIVE is the final dash to a finish where the ISP doesn't even know which Wikimedia host you visited, assuming they all share the same IP ranges. Italian Wikipedia? Simple English? Wiktionary? Wikivoyage? That's suddenly an ocean of possibilities.
Someone going on Wikipedia tells you relatively little. Knowing which specific pages they've been reading, tells you a great deal more.
HTTPS goes a long way to preventing a snooping ISP from telling which page you visited. A truly committed ISP might still be able to infer it from the traffic patterns, but they'll have a much harder time than with plaintext HTTP.