If you assume a strong password you don't need to worry about dictionary attacks.
There are 2 ways to slow down the attacks: key stretching and secure storage. Key stretching is a good idea.
I recommend not relying fully on secure storage, because I've heard of tons of hardware vulnerabilities (side channel attacks, undervoltage, electron microscopes, buggy implementation). I trust math more than a physical object. In fact it seems impossible to me to build fully secure storage, because if someone has a delicate enough measurement tool to measure the atoms inside the storage, the data inside can be extracted. If you store the password (or hashed password) as well as the key in the secure storage, and have it only return the key if the input password is correct, you run the risk of someone finding a bug in the storage to extract the key without the password. Then you're compromised.
But you build a system so that the secure storage is no worse than regular crypto. You do the encryption using a combination of the user's password and the output of the secure storage. That way even if the secure storage is fully compromised, the password is still needed.
You can't really assume a strong password, because if you have to type in 12 characters, letters and punctuation marks every time you want to look at your phone, you're going to give up on the whole thing pretty quickly.
To be usable, phones need to allow relatively weak passwords.
I've had a password like that on my (Android) phone for ~7 years and haven't given up. I don't use punctuation though, it's not worth the extra taps to get to the punctuation keyboard for the entropy you gain. I've never had fingerprint or face ID enabled either.
12 characters gives 62 bits of entropy. That's plenty if proper key strengthening is in place.
Linus Sebastian says that when his phone got slower to open up, he got happier, because it caused him to use his phone less, cutting out the useless stuff. https://youtu.be/WGZh-xP-q7A?t=305
There are 2 ways to slow down the attacks: key stretching and secure storage. Key stretching is a good idea.
I recommend not relying fully on secure storage, because I've heard of tons of hardware vulnerabilities (side channel attacks, undervoltage, electron microscopes, buggy implementation). I trust math more than a physical object. In fact it seems impossible to me to build fully secure storage, because if someone has a delicate enough measurement tool to measure the atoms inside the storage, the data inside can be extracted. If you store the password (or hashed password) as well as the key in the secure storage, and have it only return the key if the input password is correct, you run the risk of someone finding a bug in the storage to extract the key without the password. Then you're compromised.
But you build a system so that the secure storage is no worse than regular crypto. You do the encryption using a combination of the user's password and the output of the secure storage. That way even if the secure storage is fully compromised, the password is still needed.