[szszszsz]

The idea is, that hidden volumes cannot be distinguished from a random data, until the correct decryption password is entered. So while the device is capable of having a hidden volume (or more), one cannot prove its existence on device.

Disclaimer: I work with Nitrokey.

[mosselman]

I get the technology and with a random disk it could make sense: there is no way to prove that there will be a hidden volume. But if you use this with a device that was built to support this, the plausible deniability becomes less believable.

[gruez]

How does this work with SSDs supporting TRIM? If it's enabled, that large block of space would be erased by the SSD. If you put a large file in its place, that's also suspicious (huge block of random data). If you disable TRIM, also suspicious.

[szszszsz]

Nitrokey Storage uses SD card, which AFAIK does not support TRIM. Before first usage it is overwritten with a random data. Drive is presented to the OS like any regular (non-SSD) flash drive device, hence I do not think OS would issue TRIM on it.