[londons_explore]

Running as actual root in a VM would be my preferred design. There are lots of times a user might need to apt-get some dependencies for their compile job. Let an attacker do whatever they like in the VM. Then delete the VM between users.

Docker containers aren't really a good security barrier, and a VM is much better (although VM escape vulnerabilities aren't unheard of).

[rbanffy]

There are many ways a hostile program inside a VM can escape it and run code on the host or, at least, negatively affect it.

[arpa]

Please do share how can one escape qemu.

[jacquesm]

At your service:

https://www.techrepublic.com/article/vm-escape-flaw-in-qemu-...

[arpa]

Beautiful! Thank you.

[fghtr]

Not many if its Qubes OS.

[rbanffy]

One would be quite enough.

[fghtr]

In fact, Qubes is using hardware virtualization IOMMU/VT-d [0], which has been escaped only once in 2006 by the project founder [1].

[0] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Pill_(software)

[rbanffy]

I trust Joanna Rutkowska's competence, but I wouldn't bet too much on chip makers not messing up again in the future.

It will be progressively harder, but it will happen.

[zer0t3ch]

I don't know much containerization outside of docker, but you can definitely apt-get some dependencies even inside docker containers.

[londons_explore]

Inside a docker container, you are root, so you can apt-get.