[jdjdjjsjs]

I think what was ridiculously through this entire process was Boeing blaming someone else. That's pretty much been the issue right from when it surfaced. Initially it was the bad pilots, bad airlines, bad countries and lately it's been the bad software consultants.

However, it's been evident from the beginning this is a fundamental design flaw that Boeing was trying to, inappropriately, use software to make work. Something no software would be capable of doing because software could not make up for the lack of necessary information in the case of certain sensors failing.

[ulfw]

Certain sensors? Plural? They only checked ONE single sensor (which is a glitchy one at best) because their software infra didn’t support multiple checks. There should be three AoA sensors to check to see if one is faulty in flight (of course the grand old 737 only HAS two, so that’s yet another issue).

Instead they checked just one and come what may sent the plane to hell based on that one sensor read-out.

[ghshephard]

You only need two sensors to determine if one is faulty. You need three if you need the correct measurement. For this application, all that is required is a warning that the AoA sensors aren’t providing correct information.

[mantap]

That's true but it puts the aircraft at a greater risk of stalling, because MCAS is supposed to be a safety feature to prevent stalls.

Two sensors are sufficient to prevent false positives, but three or more are necessary to mitigate false negatives.

If the MAX is really so easy to stall that it needs a computer system to prevent stalls, then that system should be robust enough to survive a sensor out.

[missosoup]

There is no risk of stalling.

There was never any risk of stalling.

MCAS was added solely so that the 737 MAX 8 could share a type rating with the previous members of the 737 family. This is what allowed Airlines to put pilots on this plane without any significant new training.

Please stop perpetuating urban myths.

Here, listen to a guy who actually know what he's talking about describing the overall situation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btZXVPfh-pE

[mantap]

I don't think I'm perpetuating an urban myth. My understanding is that MCAS was necessary to correct a deficiency in the controls - that's the controls violated an FAA rule that the pitch up should not be superlinear relative to the control input (which clearly increases the risk of stall). And indeed after testing they had to increase the strength of MCAS because the tendency to pitch up was worse than previously anticipated.

The desire for a common type rating is an explanation for why the FAA rule was violated without MCAS.

[missosoup]

This is incorrect. And this has been dispelled by multiple commercial pilots including Juan from the link above who is one of the most experienced pilots in the country.

The origin of this noise is sensationalist news coverage and misinterpretation of FAA rules. I expect a higher standard on HN than perpetuating myths. You guys are like the flat earthers of aviation.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maneuvering_Characteristics_Au...

As Juan points out in either that or another video, the 767 has a stronger pitch-up characteristic and yet doesn't have MCAS and doesn't fall out of the sky from stalls.

Another myth and piece of sensationalist news bullshit is that Boeing made a safety feature that would have prevented the accidents optional. The safety feature in question was AOE Disagree Indicator. The reason it was optional is because AOA doesn't mean anything to civilian pilots and the option only made sense for airlines who hire ex-militaray pilots who can actually read the AOA indicator and make sense of it.

[7952]

I always wondered if it makes sense to base anything like this on AOA alone. The aircraft has a ground speed of several hundred knots, a sensible air speed, is at a normal attitude, in normal wind conditions, no wind sheer warnings and with normal engine function. In that situation AOA sensor failure is far more likely than a stall.

[CydeWeys]

But if they aren't providing correct information then MCAS can't work and now your plane has different flying characteristics than the older 737s, which is all your pilots are trained on because the whole point of MCAS is to prevent requiring recertification.

[a3n]

It doesn't matter what group was materially at fault, internal or external. It says "Boeing" on the tin. It's Boeing's responsibility to ensure integrity of all supply inputs, hardware or software.

Disclosure: I was a Boeing employee in the early 90s, and wrote software to control test systems that exercised electronic subsystems. The subsystems were supplied by vendors, and in some cases some of the test hardware too.

Disclaimer: I know nothing.

[Smoosh]

Also, I have read many comments on previous articles placing the blame on changes to the Boeing corporate culture. Not accepting responsibility is surely another sign of that fault.

[PedroBatista]

Right after the first crash I was surprised on how much aggressive Boeing came out blaming the pilots.

It felt weird, usually these companies wait for a good initial investigation, take some pressure and then start spreading their message through more discreet channels.

[eyegor]

I think as a corporate entity, they will never admit wrongdoing because they're terrified of lawsuits. As long as they never say "it was our fault", even if it was, I think that places (at least some of) the burden on the plaintiff in a wrongful death suit.

[thawaway1837]

There’s a difference between not accepting responsibility and aggressively blaming everyone but themselves.

The former is understandable. The latter is far more worrying.