[radeklew]

Why wouldn't it be? It seems to me that at worst we would have to wait for computers to become as powerful and complex as a human brain, and then simulating human intelligence would be a matter of accurately modelling the connections.

Is there doubt as to whether a neuron can be represented computationally?

[yters]

The mind may be nonphysical.

[13415]

That's one position, but there are three problems with it:

1. You have to solve the interaction problem (how does the mind interact with the physical world?)

2. You need to explain why the world is not physically closed without blatantly violating physical theory / natural laws.

3. From the fact that the mind is nonphysical, it does not follow that computationalism is false. On the contrary, I'd say that computationalism is still the best explanation of how human thinking works even for a dualist. (All the alternatives are quite mystical, except maybe for hypercomputationalism.)

[yters]

1. No I don't. I don't have to explain how gravity works to know that it does and make scientific claims about its operation. Likewise, I can scientifically demonstrate the mind is non physical and interacts with our physical world without explaining how.

2. If the world is not physically closed then physical theory and natural laws are not violated, since they would not apply to anything beyond the physical world.

3. True, but if the mind can be shown to perform physically uncomputable tasks, then we can infer the mind is not physical. In which case we can also apply Occam's razor and infer the mind is doing something uncomputable as opposed to having access to vast immaterial computational resources.

Finally, calling a position names, such as 'mystical', does nothing to determine the veracity of the position. At best it is counter productive by distracting from the logic of the argument.

[13415]

I wasn't trying to argue with you, I merely laid out what is commonly thought about the subject matter. Sorry if that sounds patronizing (it's really not meant to). Anyway, if you want to publish a paper defending a dualist position nowadays in any reputable journal, you'll have to address points 1&2 in one way or another, whether you believe you have to or not. It's not as if that problem hadn't been discussed during the past 60 years or so. There are whole journals dedicated to it.

> if the mind can be shown to perform physically uncomputable tasks

That's true. Many people have tried that and many people believe they can show it. Roger Penrose, for example. These arguments are usually based on complexity theory or the Halting Problem and involve certain views about what mathematicians can and cannot do. As I've said, I've personally not been convinced by any of those arguments.

Your mileage may differ. Fair enough. Just make sure that you do not "know the answer" already when starting to think about the problem, because that's what many people seem to do when they think about these kind of problems and it's a pity.

> calling a position names, such as 'mystical', does nothing to determine the veracity of the position. At best it is counter productive by distracting from the logic of the argument.

That wasn't my intention, I use "mystical" in this context in the sense of "does not provide any better understanding or scientifically acceptable explanation." Many of the (modern) arguments in this area are inferences to the best explanation.

By the way, correctly formulated computationalism does not presume physicalism. It is fully compatible with dualism.

[yters]

Yes, I understand computationalism does not imply physicalism, but physicalism does imply computationalism. Thus, if computationalism is empirically refuted, then physicalism is false.

I know the Lucas Godel incompleteness theorem type arguments. Whether successful or not, the counter arguments are certainly fallacious. E.g. just because I form a halting problem for myself does not mean I am not a halting oracle for uncomputable problems.

But, I have developed a more empirical approach, something that can be solved by the average person, not dealing with whether they can find the Godel sentence for a logic system.

Also, there is a lot of interesting research showing that humans are very effective at approximating solutions to NP complete problems, apparently better than the best known algorithms. While not conclusive proof in itself, such examples are very surprising if there is nothing super computational about the human mind, and less so if there is.

At any rate, there are a number of lines of evidence I'm aware of that makes the uncomputable mind a much more plausible explanation for what we see humans do, ignoring the whole problem of consciousness. I'm just concerned with empirical results, not philosophy or math. As such, I don't really care what some journal's idea of the burden of proof is. I care about making discoveries and moving our scientific knowledge and technology forward.

Additionally, this is not some academic speculation. If the uncomputable mind thesis is true, then there are technological gains to be made, such as through human in the loop approaches to computation. Arguably, that is where all the successful AI and ML is going these days, so that serves as yet one more line of evidence for the uncomputable mind thesis.

[inimino]

> physicalism does imply computationalism

That's not true either.

There are plenty of materialists who think the universe is not computable, thus it's totally possible to believe that the mind is not computable despite being entirely physical.

[perl4ever]

Explaining how gravity works doesn't tell you whether gravity itself is a real thing, whether it is metaphysical, whether it's an epiphenomena of something else. People talk about it being curvature in spacetime vs. a force, but we're just reifying the math, right?

And I don't think we have a completely firm grasp on what is possible computationally with a given amount of physical resources, given the development of quantum computing.

[yters]

The metaphysics are unimportant. The important question as far as AGI is concerned is whether human intelligence is physically computable. And quantum computation is less powerful than non deterministic Turing computation. So, we can bound quantum computation with NTMs.

[Geee]

AGI doesn't mean human-like. The idea is not to clone the "nonphysicality" of the human brain but vastly surpass it in raw intelligence.

[randomidiot666]

Yes there is doubt. Can you say for sure that we have a complete model of all physics, and that all physics can be represented computationally? We're still discovering new features of neurons at the quantum level. Who knows how far down it goes. There may be some unknown physics at play inside neurons that can not be computed by a Turing machine. https://www.elsevier.com/about/press-releases/research-and-j...

[Jeff_Brown]

There are aspects of quantum that we don't understand, but we have no reason to believe intelligence relies on them, any more than bridges do.

[randomidiot666]

We actually do have reason to believe that, since our current understanding of consciousness is very incomplete. Human consciousness extends far beyond our current understanding. I am referring to the full extent of the capabilities of the human mind, not some isolated aspects of it.

The physics of bridges is well known. That is basically a solved problem. Human consciousness/intelligence is an open problem, and may never be solved.

[Jeff_Brown]

> We actually do have reason to believe that [intelligence relies on quantum properties]

Are you leaving the reason unsaid, or am I in fact reading your argument correctly: "We don't understand consciousness, and we don't understand quantum, therefore it is likely consciousness relies on quantum." There's already plenty of mystery in an ordinary deterministic computation-driven approach to intelligence.

[randomidiot666]

No I'm saying: "We don't have a perfectly accurate physical model of consciousness, we know that physics is incomplete, and our current model of neurons extends to the lowest levels of known physics, therefore there may be unknown physics involved in consciousness, and those unknown physics may not be computable."

[Jeff_Brown]

In response to

> > we have no reason to believe intelligence relies on [as-yet mysterious aspects of quantum physics]

you wrote

> We actually do have reason to believe that ...

and later clarified

> [some true premises], therefore there may be unknown physics involved in consciousness, and those unknown physics may not be computable.

Saying something could be is different from saying we have reason to believe it. There may be a soul. Absent convincing evidence of the soul, though, we shouldn't predicate other research on the idea that it exists.

[randomidiot666]

I clarified it in my latest reply above. The original comment asked if there is any doubt as to whether a neuron can be represented computationally. We don't know exactly what a neuron is, and are still discovering new subtle mechanisms in their functioning, and they are part of the most complex structure in the known universe, therefore of course there is doubt.