[rlucas]

Fact 4 is largely incorrect. Boards with adversarial relationships with large blocs of shareholders generally adopt provisions like staggered board terms (like the US Senate).

Fact 3 is also a fairly fanciful interpretation. Large public corporate board membership can be lucrative, but is in practice not competed for by a talent pool the way that say, a CTO or VP of Sales or CFO role would be. New board members are almost always vetted and nominated by the existing board. Hence new board members are nearly always either 1. in-group members (a cynic would say "cronies") with satisficing business acumen from the same social/business milieu as the incumbents, or in the exceptional case, 2. high visibility outsiders (a cynic would say "window-dressing") from other endeavors, such as former politicians, admirals and generals, etc. A new movement adds a third possible vector in, namely being a highly qualified business person with a politically / optically desirable diversity characteristic. But once that candidate comes in, they quickly will learn that the means to stay in the Inner Ring and gain lucrative additional such opportunities is to toe the line...

I'm sympathetic to your idea of emergent behaviors of the group arising from knowable axioms about the individuals and their motivation but I think you've got some incorrect axioms about the selection and incentives of those individuals.