[TimTheTinker]

> This seems like a extreme argument.

Not at all. Good security often involves some black-and-white thinking, which not everyone is accustomed to.

If Facebook controls the endpoint, then they have the power to access the plaintext, full stop. Using their product (hopefully) implies a choice to trust them not to abuse such access.

[fooker]

Ok, what about the closed source hardware in the phones?

Would you argue against all encryption because clearly the CPU maker has a similar access to all decrypted content?

[lmm]

I'd argue for not trusting a cryptosystem that requires you to use a particular vendor's CPUs. Open standards and independent implementations at every level should be table stakes.

[ip26]

Although I argue the black-and-white "everyone is a potential adversary" thinking is misguided. Your threat model determines requisite security measures, and you usually have to trust someone. (Although Facebook should probably not be that someone)

[gimmeThaBeet]

> Using their product (hopefully) implies a choice to trust them not to abuse such access.

Which is what...they said?