[colorincorrect]

is there a similar analysis of google/facebook/instagram?

[ignoramous]

Facebook: https://privacyinternational.org/report/2647/how-apps-androi...

news.yc discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19595478

And some techscience.org classics: https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&que...

[holler]

fyi amazon does this too.. likely most large consumer sites that face fraud activity do

[seppin]

Yes, they don't give the data they harvest to an authoritarian government that already has proven they will use said data to target and ID people for arrest/detention/torture.

Which is an important distinction.

[bduerst]

TikTok has said that their TikTok China and TikTok elsewhere apps keep their app and user data completely separate (in both data centers and policy).

Kind of like how Apple complies with iCloud China and Apple iCloud everywhere else.

Source: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tiktok-army/army-exam...

[Beefin]

How is it possible that there be two separate silos when I can follow someone in China despite being in the US

[yorwba]

The person in China can use TikTok (international) or you can use Douyin (Chinese), putting the two of you in the same silo.

[seppin]

Are you seriously implying the Chinese government doesn't have access to both of these sets of data?

[yorwba]

I was answering the question about following someone in the other silo (not possible), not implying that the siloing makes data exfiltration absolutely impossible.

Note however that for the Chinese silo, they can just open the front door, whereas doing the same for the international version would endanger their profits. Profit is an incentive the CCP responds to very well. For the surveillance agencies, hacking the database is probably easier than setting up an official channel that too many people would have to know about and agree to.

[seppin]

And if the CCP asked for access to TikTok's international data, do you think they have the ability to say no?