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Sure, they are more isolated. And in some ways they are more fragile. But my point is that they're not nearly as fragile as we believed. And more importantly a faulty premise--that they're extremely fragile--gave way to a faulty scientific conclusion--that gametes were impervious to common environmental stressors like the many infections that ravage our bodies. We can't draw simple, categorical conclusions about gene editing, nor even germline editing in particular, because there are no simple, categorical distinctions. Suffice it to say, it's complex. Whenever we try to be reductivist about such things we end up drawing erroneous and even dangerous conclusions; e.g. gamete fragility -> viral imperviousness as solution to observed lack of harm -> underestimation of viral stressors and risks, and overestimation of gene editing risks. Regarding stakes, what I had in mind was classic economic behavioral experiments where they show that a change in the magnitude of a bet changes choices in an irrational manner even though the expected payoff is exactly the same; even when you take into account marginal utility effects. Yes, germline edits don't just effect one person, they theoretically could infect all of humanity. But so what? Remember when they were firing up the LHC and people were freaking out at the possible creation of blackholes. Given the error bars in known physics, there was a non-zero chance running the experiments could have destroyed the world.[1] Because nothing we could possibly learn would compensate for losing everything, does that mean we should never have turned it on? No. The calculus didn't change. That germline edits propagate doesn't mean our harm+benefit calculus changes; it's just that one of the risk factors in the equation changes from a 1 to something larger. Other factors, like confidence, may or may not need to be changed. Regarding the argument that by intervening scientifically we're categorically more culpable than if we didn't do anything, that touches upon the is/ought and naturalistic fallacies. From a utilitarian perspective intervention vs non-intervention is irrelevant. I'm not a Utilitarian (capital U), but I don't see how we can have a constructive, scientific debate outside a utilitarian framework. Such lines of reasoning are more relevant to political and religious contexts. [1] Well, maybe. Actually, perhaps many physicists would have said that the consensus science would have put the chance at 0. But the best argument was made by people pointing out that the Earth's atmosphere was constantly bombarded by particles far more energetic than what the LHC would create. Which is exactly analogous to germline editing. The fact is, the germline undergoes far more genetic stressors than we once believed. It must follow that it's more resilient than we believed, genetically, developmentally, and from an evolutionary perspective. |
You're arguing from some abstract philosophical perspective, but the practical situation is much simpler. Nobody is drawing categorical conclusions and saying that we should never edit the germline, and at the same time the opinion that we should do germline editing right now is fringe. The tools, while much better than ten years ago, still suck. Outside a few well-characterized alleles in Mendelian diseases, nobody knows what to edit, what side effects edits will have or why. It's likely that in a few years we will know, given that we're quickly improving both the molecular techniques and the genome knowledge bases necessary to understand the consequences of the edits. But until then, it's dangerous and unethical to experiment on babies without their consent or pressing medical need, and scientists are right to freak out about it.