[allovernow]

CCTV cameras have been around for decades and have none of the privacy issues associated with ring. Of course there's a little more overhead in setting them up which I'm sure turns the average person off, but they also won't brick if the manufacturer stops supporting them and don't need internet to work.

[est31]

If your CCTV camera setup has no live off site backups, someone burglaring the property could just take or destroy the recorder on-site and delete the record of them breaking into the property.

[nullc]

Yes, and if we're talking hypothetical risk vectors: a ring camera does nothing against someone who covers their face.

The reliance on remote storage limits the resolution and number of cameras, making it much less likely that you'll manage to capture a clear face shot esp from someone intentionally concealing their face.

Thieves stealing the recorder is something I think I've never heard reported in a residential setting, however. It's certainly a much less common problem for cameras than people covering their faces.

Non-cloud camera systems can still upload remotely (and there is the potential of encrypting those realtime backups, at least w/ some systems). My camera system takes periodic and event driven still snapshots, encrypts them, and uploads them remotely. (Though, I admit, I implemented the encryption step myself). Bonus: sending only snapshots means that it can reasonably be done over cellular, which keeps it going even if all the lines are cut.

[est31]

> Non-cloud camera systems can still upload remotely

I have only talked about cloud based backups, not running the entire system via the cloud. Of course it's best if you have an on-site storage of video material, as well as a (live) off-site backup.

I'm not a proponent of Ring. In fact, I'd never put their hardware into my house. However, there are advantages of putting video footage into the cloud (encrypted or in the clear). Compare this to internet based locks where there are no advantages that can't be done locally as well.

[e2le]

I'm not convinced off-site backups are enough to protect against burglars destroying the footage. There are many options available to them to prevent the camera from functioning.

1) In the case of WiFi cameras, sending of deauth packets or signal jamming the 2.4/5ghz spectrum.

2) Damaging of fibre/copper cables which might be out of view of the camera.

3) Turning off power to the property although this might draw attention.

Given the sheer popularity of WiFi cameras, I can't see it being too long before a device capable of spamming deauth packets becomes a common part of the burglars toolset. esp8266's with the appropriate firmware can already be found on ebay for less than £10.

[est31]

Of course in physical security, for every protection there's always a way for attackers to counter it. But it gets more and more costly each time. What I wanted to say with my comment is that off site backups do have value (compared to say cloud based door locks which don't have any advantage over internet free approaches).

For 1 and 2, ideally you'd avoid WiFi cameras for the reason you stated and use cable based ones and put everything into view.

To 3, actually this happened recently in my country Germany where they stole crown jewels of one of the german states. The alarm system died and allowed for silent entry but the CCTV still worked (no idea why it worked tho, maybe backup power for CCTV only but not for the alarm?). Ideally both your CCTV and alarm system run from some way of backup power.

[autoexec]

> I can't see it being too long before a device capable of spamming deauth packets becomes a common part of the burglars toolset.

How many break ins are professional thieves with any kind of toolkit vs drug addicts and kids who just smash a window with whatever they find or take advantage of opportunities like an unlocked car or a package left outside? I'm guessing that the vast majority aren't bringing tech, lockpicks or even masks.

[e2le]

You might be right, apparently only 4.1% of burglaries involve a lockpick.

https://www.art-of-lockpicking.com/criminals-dont-pick-locks...

[Johnny555]

I'm surprised it's even that high, lock picks are pretty time consuming and it's hard to be inconspicuous while you're doing it.

Ahh, I looked at the linked article, and it's not just lockpicking, it's "picked lock or window", which presumably also includes things like using a knife blade to slide a window latch open.

Further in the article it mentions this:

If you were to separate lock picking from shimming latches, the percentage of lock picking incidents would very likely evaporate.

...

However, because we have no data to separate these two methods of bypassing — that is lock picking and shimming –, we will stick with the higher survey number of 4.1% for good measure.

But wait, that’s 4.1% of ONLY non-forced burglaries. What about ALL burglaries— forced and non-forced?

...

That’s only 1.36% of TOTAL burglaries that utilize either picking a lock or shimming.

[autoexec]

As a hobbyist lockpicker, I still keep running into the assumption that they're most often used for breaking into places. Good to have a source to show they aren't "mainly used for crime"

[awalton]

Sure. Criminals could also hack into Ring's servers and delete footage there too...

Of course, neither of these are likely to happen, as criminals that are doing burglaries are in a hurry and not looking for security camera DVRs and data stores, but valuables they can fence quickly like TVs, stereos and jewelry.

If "Stealing your CCTV's recorder" is actually in your threat model, maybe then you should consider a cloud-based solution (or, you know, a real security system and not just a CCTV system). But this just isn't the general case - not even close. The vast majority of these systems are essentially nanny/evil-maid cams.

[cgsmith]

This is a risk. The risk is minimal as most criminals do not destroy the recorder. To minimize the risk the owner could configure the Video Management System to store video offsite. Or the owner could configure the VMS to send an email with video on motion or a digital input paired with a burglar system.

[LinuxBender]

If your system can write 60 second video chunks, then you can sftp the data to a write-only (append only) off site location and only when there is motion. If your system is properly physically secured, then the most you can lose is 60 seconds of them tampering with the cabinet.

[tehlike]

End to end encryption would solve for the downsides.