[goatlover]

> You could argue in the same specious way that a computer is not a computer because it is really a bunch of atoms interacting via non deterministic quantum mechanical rules so it can't really implement deterministic algorithms and error free information storage.

Jaron Lanier argues that computers and computation are cultural. Why give them a special ontological status? Yeah, we can think of the universe as computational or informational. We can also think of it as mathematical, mental or just whatever physics posits (fields, strings, higher dimensions, etc). Whatever the case, when someone like the article in the OP states that reality is X, then an ontological claim is being made. Its metaphysics.

One could instead argue that the world just is itself, and anything we say about it is our human model or best approximation. Which would be a combination of realism (the world itself) and idealism (how we make sense of it). Then it's just a matter of not mistaking the map for the territory. Instead of saying that the brain or the universe is X, we say that X is our best current map for Y. We don't say that London is a map. That would be making a category error.