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by IC4RUS
2399 days ago
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I think you're missing another possibility (and some other posters are too): maybe it is the case that a simulation can produce consciousness, by simulating a brain for example, but that it takes a sufficiently powerful model of computation to do so. So, consciousness being computable may not necessarily imply that any given computer could do so. One potential way for this to be the case is if consciousness is tied to some form of hypercomputation (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation), which can provide outputs that are not turing-computable. This would mean that a traditional computer couldn't simulate consciousness, but that another hypothetical machine might be able to. |
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Bostrom is assuming there's a thing called "computation" which is somehow a fully-specified solved problem. (It isn't).
Worse, he's also assuming that this "computation" can somehow simulate something called "consciousness" - which unfortunately for him, is nowhere near to having the formal rigorous definition that "computation" as we know it today would require.
And finally after all that, you get something which is subjectively indistinguishable from life itself.
Well - obviously. If you don't define any of your terms and assume your argument is correct because you don't show your working or get into specifics, you can argue whatever you like.