Not as sensitive as accidentally dropping information about your internal network. then take the long-troll method of infiltrating an upstream provider to attack a juicy target (build system of fortune 500? yes please)
or maybe catching wind of some dev keys that really are root keys..
many reasons to sanitize git history before open sourcing. in fact many organizations i have worked with still maintain two separate repos, one internal and one open source using fancy magic (either with git or with additional tools) to sanitize and sync commits between the two. i've seen code commits to a large organization that are then packaged up and inspected for license and security violations in an untrusted environment.. many reasons to keep two (or more) running copies
or maybe catching wind of some dev keys that really are root keys..
many reasons to sanitize git history before open sourcing. in fact many organizations i have worked with still maintain two separate repos, one internal and one open source using fancy magic (either with git or with additional tools) to sanitize and sync commits between the two. i've seen code commits to a large organization that are then packaged up and inspected for license and security violations in an untrusted environment.. many reasons to keep two (or more) running copies