| To expand on your example: I invest $100 for 20% of your venture, implicitly valuing the company at $500 . You sell for $200. - Standard preference: I get $100 or 20% of the company ($40) - 2x preference: I get $200 or 20% ($40) - Participating preferred: I get $100 and 20% of the company ($140) IMO, 1x preference, non-preferred is entirely fair. In the event the company sells for lower than the valuation, the investors get their money back first. The vulnerability it protects against is that I found a company for $0, you invest $100 for 20%, then I immediately turn around and sell for $101. You get $20.25 and I get $79.75. Participating preferred and >1x preference are unconscionable. |
Founders don't like liquidation preferences for the same reason employees don't --- especially if the company limps to liquidity, which is probably the common case, as opposed to blowing the doors off things, in which case the prefs probably don't matter that much. They're incentivized not to accept high preferences; if they do accept them, isn't that just a sign that the company didn't have much bargaining power? Should the company not take the money under those circumstances, and RIF its team instead?