[backdoorsgalore]

All public encryption algorithms have backdoors in their implementation and sometimes (as with Elliptic Curve standards from NIST adopted in the browser) in their spec.

You might get lucky if you have a cryptographer design you a custom algorithm but that's mostly security thru obscurity and if a state actor really wanted to defeat it they may just kidnap the cryptographer at gun point and have them reveal how to.

Cryptography as a weapon against state actors is NO LESS BRAINLESS than the right to bear arms to protect against the US gov. Just completely useless, if not brain dead.

[AdieuToLogic]

> All public encryption algorithms have backdoors in their implementation ...

Okay, this is the first time I can recall having ever asked the following:

Source?

I mean, if you're going to make that type of absolute claim, I must ask for some referenes to support same.

[jonathanstrange]

Although you're right that anything but OTPs give you guarantees and that cryptography is still a black art (with lots of unrealistic conditional proofs), good cryptography can be completely open and will be no less secure if it is published, so there is really no need to kidnap the cryptographer.

There is also good reason to assume that if e.g. you make your own Feistel cipher out of existing cryptographic primitives without caring too much about performance, then it will be secure enough against state actors.

Nowadays side channel attacks seem to be the rule, and there is no way to secure the endpoints without developing the whole technology in-house - which is essentially impossible even for organized crime. So the whole discussion is essentially moot, the FBI can buy 0-day exploits on the black market or develop their own like everyone else.

[necovek]

If this was the case, there would be no push in government sectors to diminish cryptography and provide backdoors.

Or perhaps they are double-bluffing us? ;-)

[authoritarian]

>All public encryption algorithms have backdoors in their implementation and sometimes (as with Elliptic Curve standards from NIST adopted in the browser) in their spec

Lets see your proofs demonstrating this

[adrianN]

Encryption is not trivial to implement right, but it is also not impossible to defend against reasonable threat models. You make claims without giving any proof.