[parsimo2010]

It is irreleveant if AEB fails when a human doesn't- the human and AEB systems are complimentary. When the human driver doesn't fail, then it's okay for AEB to fail. AEB only needs to pick up the slack when a human isn't fast enough to get on the brakes. Even if it only works in 10% of those situations, it's still preventing collisions.

[ShroudedNight]

> It is irrelevant if AEB fails when a human doesn't

This is only true with false-negatives. A false-positive (say, on a pedestrian-free, controlled access highway) could easily be actively harmful if it causes abrupt changes in vehicle behaviour that would not occur if a human were in full control.

[unityByFreedom]

> It is irreleveant if AEB fails when a human doesn't

Maybe in the eyes of the law. If pedestrian-detection-equipped vehicles cause more deaths, however, it is quite relevant.

[fucking_tragedy]

It matters to me as a pedestrian because drivers will become reliant on their AEB, and when it fails, they might run me over.

[natch]

We better design these systems not to fail then. Seems obvious but I think that’s the solution to what you’re describing. Having an unreliable human as a backup is not going to do it because as you say, and I agree, humans will become reliant on it.

The systems are not reliable yet. Fortunately humans are not totally reliant on them yet either so humans are still effective as a safety backup.

The trick is to make sure the crossover point (when humans become so reliant that they are ineffective safety backups) comes after the system becomes highly reliable. Unfortunately humans are already unreliable to begin with even without AEB, so we are just going to deal with a few incidents from autos, both those without AEB, and, until it becomes perfect, those with AEB.

[fucking_tragedy]

> We better design these systems not to fail then

Too late, we're commenting on an article about them failing in common scenarios.

[natch]

But we're not done designing them. This is an ongoing project.