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by wolf550e
2447 days ago
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^ primary contact author of the paper in question Thank you for the explanation! In https://minerva.crocs.fi.muni.cz/#details-reasons and in your comment you're describing two bad ways to do scalarmult, but you do not show side-by-side the correct way (e.g. what ref10 does). Can you describe it in a sentence or two? |
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One of the main points in the root causes discussion is that without complete formulas you are almost always going to leak the bit-length, so the only way to not be vulnerable in that case is to fix the bit-length to a constant value. This cannot be done naively by simply setting the high bit, because this would introduce bias in the nonces which would be exploitable even without measuring the duration, a much worse attack! However it can be done via the method suggested by Brumley & Tuveri in https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232 where you add a multiple of the curve order to the scalar to fix its bit-length. This means the distribution of the nonce modulo the order remains the same (uniform, no bias) yet the bit-length used in scalarmult as a loop bound is constant.