[jeanl]

I am as outraged at Boeing's ineptitude as anybody with a rational mind, but I can't read this kind of article without cringing. Sentences like "about two weeks after the system’s unthinkable stupidity drove the two-month-old plane and all 189 people on it to a horrific death" should raise alarm bells in any reader's mind. This is probably a writer who knows nothing about aviation and/or software engineering yet feels very comfortable calling a system "unthinkably stupid". This smacks of oversimplification and just plain sloppiness. There are many articles on the entire debacle that are a lot more measured, and smart about their analysis, including quite a few great reads that were mentioned here in HN.

[chroem-]

I used to work as a controls engineer. Sensor fusion and redundancy is one of the most basic concepts in controls, and yet it was totally absent from a system that was responsible for flying the aircraft. There is more redundancy built into your office building's HVAC system than was built into the 737's MCAS. That really is inexcusable.

[cmurf]

Actually, per the article, the lack of redundancy was central to hiding the feature from the FAA, keeping it out of the FOM, and ensuring the avoidance of any scenario that would entail extra pilot training. Whether two or three sensors, any disagreement among them would have involved a more complex system, and would risk necessitating an in-cockpit notification of that disagreement, and the ensuing training so the pilots understand the exact consequences of the disagreement and a procedure for mitigating it.

And the article explicitly dings Southwest Airlines as having provided Boeing a financial incentive to avoiding them needing additional simulator training.

[akiselev]

> Whether two or three sensors, any disagreement among them would have involved a more complex system, and would risk necessitating an in-cockpit notification of that disagreement, and the ensuing training so the pilots understand the exact consequences of the disagreement and a procedure for mitigating it.

The in-cockpit notification light, "AOA Disagree," was a paid upgrade [1].

I don't know what the article is on about.

[1] https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/boeing-bosses-una...

[cmurf]

a. The AoA disagree alert is standard, not a paid upgrade.

b. The AoA indicator is a paid upgrade.

c. In most 737 MAX's, the disagree alert did not function correctly (did not function as they supposedly intended) unless you bought the paid upgrade for the indicator.

d. Neither the alert nor indicator were considered safety equipment, they were considered advisory.

e. If the alert indicates a caution or warning, it's going to be listed in the flight manual, and decently likely a procedure for understanding and handling that condition must exist, and if so it's going to be a part of a training regimen, the very thing airlines wanted to avoid.

The two changes already planned: decoupling the disagree alert and angle indicator. Upon disagreement, MCAS is disabled. That means the disagree alert is at least cautionary now, because it means the airplane's stall behavior will be different than other 737s. That absolutely will require simulator training for pilots.

One of the most central questions is whether the assessment that the disagree alert was not "safety equipment" was wrong. That MCAS, in an angle of attack disagree condition, can so quickly induce, entirely on its own, catastrophic mistrim at low altitude, is rather damning. It suggests the risk assessment process is flawed.

[mjevans]

Indeed, it's the motive to have done things wrong rather than in any type of correct way.

[V_Terranova_Jr]

I'm an aerospace engineer who does work for the U.S. Government. When it comes to journalism, I'm a stickler for not oversimplifying the technical in attempt to make things understandable to the layperson or to support feeling-based arguments. I definitely agree the author has an unapologetic opinion/viewpoint in the writing, and I too was looking for where they oversimplified technical detail.

The sentence after "This alteration created a shift in the plane’s center of gravity pronounced enough that it raised a red flag when the MAX was still just a model plane about the size of an eagle, running tests in a wind tunnel" marks a bloc of technically sloppy oversimplification.

That criticism noted, I couldn't materially fault anything else in the writing and in fact I learned some things about my own industry. On the whole, it is a really valuable piece that I will be sharing with my colleagues.

[pdonis]

> Sentences like "about two weeks after the system’s unthinkable stupidity drove the two-month-old plane and all 189 people on it to a horrific death" should raise alarm bells in any reader's mind.

Yes, exactly: that's the point. Yes, a lot of technical detail is left out, but the average lay person doesn't care about the technical detail. They just want the bottom line. And as someone who has spent quite a bit of time digging into the technical details, I have a hard time quarreling with the language this author chose to describe the bottom line. This is not a case of "well, it's complicated". This really is a simple case at bottom: an unthinkably stupid system, a product of a frighteningly common managerial and corporate outlook, killed everyone on board two airplanes. And the author wants that to raise alarm bells in every reader's mind--so that maybe those readers will start wondering whether letting such a system continue unrestrained is a good idea.

[simion314]

The article is focusing on the management part and is missing in the technical details but still presents those questionable things the hardware + software did . I mean how would you call adding hack over hack and other hack to solve a fundamental issue , sounds very familiar with the software industry where when you are rushed to put a fix ASAP and you put a ugly hack in and write a TODO that this should be redone properly. Also you have the trim wheels that you can't use them in all conditions,that is stupid IMO, there were designed probably 50 years ago and never updated when the plane size and engine were increased.

[tootie]

It seems like a pretty logical inference looking at the evidence.

[selimthegrim]

You should see her obit of Steve Jobs which makes this look like a hagiography