I would actually still place this failure directly at Boeing's feet.
Games like the ones Boeing was trying to play (overhauling an entire aircraft without having to change type rating and retrain pilots) directly lead to situations like this. Yes, the FAA / NTSB should have been more effective, but regulatory capture like this is common. It's ultimately Boeing's job to manage the risk: losing 2 airframes in a matter of months because pilots weren't trained on the aircraft as a result of Boeing's mismanagement has done catastrophic damage to their reputation that will take decades to repair. They will now be under a microscope for everything they do, which means they can't use a lot of the less risky cost-cutting they were likely doing before.
The net result of Boeing's machinations to keep the 737-Max at the same type rating led directly to a situation where pilots were not sufficiently trained in the functionality of the aircraft. So I have zero sympathy for the view that Boeing is not entirely responsible for this situation.
Yes, I'm surprised that more shareholders and more of Congress haven't been calling both for Dennis Muilenburg's head and the end to self certification.
It might make everyone feel better if he was fired, but little else. He became CEO one month before the first fuselage was completed and six months before the first flight, having been in charge of the defense unit. Perhaps a better but less satisfying target would be Ray Conner (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raymond_Conner) who was head of commercial aviation from 2012 to 2016, or perhaps Jim Albaugh, his predecessor. Crucial engineering decisions would have been made during these years.
That is pretty blatant and frankly insulting (both for the pilots and the reader's intelligence). I actually did a double-take on this bit:
> His co-pilot was an Indonesian 10 years his elder who went by the single name Harvino[...]. Like thousands of new pilots now meeting the demands for crews — especially those in developing countries with rapid airline growth — his experience with flying was scripted, bounded by checklists and cockpit mandates and dependent on autopilots. He had some rote knowledge of cockpit procedures as handed down from the big manufacturers, but he was weak in an essential quality known as airmanship. Sadly, his captain turned out to be weak in it, too.
[...]
> [“Airmanship”'s] full meaning is difficult to convey. It includes a visceral sense of navigation, an operational understanding of weather and weather information, the ability to form mental maps of traffic flows, fluency in the nuance of radio communications and, especially, a deep appreciation for the interplay between energy, inertia and wings. Airplanes are living things. The best pilots do not sit in cockpits so much as strap them on.
Am I reading an article about airplanes or some pamphlet for essential oils or audiophile gear? "Crisp sound, deep basses, muddy mid-range, decent airmanship".
On another forum that'd make for nice copypasta:
> “31337 h4x0r”'s full meaning is difficult to convey. It includes a visceral sense of Vim motions, an operational understanding of Virtual Memory mapping and paging information, the ability to form mental maps of callstacks, fluency in the nuance of various calling conventions and, especially, a deep appreciation for the interplay between energy, scripting engines and multithreading. Computers are living things. The best coders are artisans more than engineers.
I'll be sure to keep this one saved somewhere for the next time I crash something in production.
Games like the ones Boeing was trying to play (overhauling an entire aircraft without having to change type rating and retrain pilots) directly lead to situations like this. Yes, the FAA / NTSB should have been more effective, but regulatory capture like this is common. It's ultimately Boeing's job to manage the risk: losing 2 airframes in a matter of months because pilots weren't trained on the aircraft as a result of Boeing's mismanagement has done catastrophic damage to their reputation that will take decades to repair. They will now be under a microscope for everything they do, which means they can't use a lot of the less risky cost-cutting they were likely doing before.
The net result of Boeing's machinations to keep the 737-Max at the same type rating led directly to a situation where pilots were not sufficiently trained in the functionality of the aircraft. So I have zero sympathy for the view that Boeing is not entirely responsible for this situation.