[sls]

I don't agree that a definition of multiplication that includes transcendentals such as pi must be numerical. In fact, to the extent that numerical approximations are approximations _of_ something, the thing they would be approximating is the actual value of the operation of multiplication being applied to pi and pi. The only reason we're talking about algorithms at all was to distinguish between them and definitions.

[jacobolus]

Well, that’s a philosophical rather than mathematical question. I don’t really believe in a concept of “actual value” outside of the context of computations (though I don’t mind conceding it as a matter of convenience and social convention, since the distinction almost never matters for practical purposes). I am not an expert, but mathematicians have investigated this, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computable_analysis

We can treat π purely symbolically if we like, but as soon as we want to do anything useful with it we need some kind of approximation or algorithm.

[sls]

I am familiar with the constructivist family of ideas. Obviously I agree this a question of philosophy, specifically the philosophy of mathematics. (So not "rather than", since foundations of mathematics is a branch of mathematics.) And because adopting a constructivist approach to mathematics means adopting different ideas about what a mathematical definition _is_ or _can be_, I have to say that it's a bit disingenuous to introduce this context only after engaging in the above discussion.

For example, if someone asks you to explain Euclid's proof of the infinitude of the primes, and you say that Euclid did not provide any such proof and nothing more, I think it's quite disingenuous. It would be more proper to say, from a constructivist view, the argument Euclid made isn't a valid proof, and then either explain the proof in the logical context in which it was made or decline to.

In this case, the point of discussion was separating the definition of multiplication from an algorithm implementing it. It's quite unfair to silently take a position that a mathematical definition without an algorithm isn't valid or meaningful and then on that basis argue that only numerical approximations to transcendentals have meaning.

So many common mathematical concepts such as "the integers" have no meaning in a constructivist approach that it's not sensible to engage in mathematical discussion without establishing that one's fundamental basis of approach varies so widely from the common one.