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by jMyles
2485 days ago
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Sure, got that. But doesn't it also mean that, as the committee cycles, the likelihood of compromised nodes eventually being part of the cohort increases? If you have a minute, maybe evaluate this statement to see if I've got it right: The attack surface presented by CHURP, in contrast to vanilla SSS, is more robust against an attacker who, throughout the lifecycle of the secret, begins with few compromised nodes and increases her circle of influence throughout? It is, at least in some cases, weaker against an established attacker who begins the lifecycle already having compromised several nodes and who can afford to wait until the right combination of nodes is selected for committee participation. Do I have that right? Interesting stuff, either way. Have we ever met? Were you at EthBerlin last week? |
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And, I'd think fixing the committee is worse, as it presents a static point of attack from adversarial POV. If you want any amount of decentralization, handling churn seems essential.
No, I was thinking about Devcon, but I don't want to travel half way across the world ;)