[bluedevil2k]

These types of auctions are very common when dealing with spectrum auctions (5G for example). As an example, there are 60 MHz of spectrum for sale, and they are broken down into 4 15 MHz blocks. The first stage of the auction will determine which bidders win how many blocks using a clock auction. After the market price per block is established, a 2nd phase of the auction will take place, using the VCG, that allows the winners to price which specific block(s) they want. (Some blocks are better than others...for example if you win 2 blocks, you very much want those to be contiguous, also edge of spectrum blocks are less desirable because they may get interference). The auction ends after this phase, with the winners paying their sum from stage 1 and stage 2.

In fact, I would say this is one of the most common spectrum auction format right now, used throughout the world, the other swapping in a combinatorial for step 2. (The FCC doesn't run this style due to the size of the US, among other factors).

[nwah1]

Yep. I've heard VCG or combinatorial auctions proposed as a solution for various problems.

I think it is used for advertising slots, and airline gates, but could be used for logistics brokerages, or unit rentals in skyscrapers.

The wiki article on combinatorial auctions provides examples.

>Simple combinatorial auctions have been used for many years in estate auctions, where a common procedure is to accept bids for packages of items. They have been used recently for truckload transportation, bus routes, industrial procurement, and in the allocation of radio spectrum for wireless communications. In recent years, procurement teams have applied reverse combinatorial auctions in the procurement of goods and services.

>Combinatorial auctions were first proposed by Rassenti, Smith, and Bulfin (1982), for the allocation of airport landing slots.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combinatorial_auction

[bluedevil2k]

Combinatorial is popular for spectrum auctions as well. Typically it's used in auctions where there are different bands of frequencies being sold at the same time (700Mhz and 2.1 GHz in the same auction for example). In that situation, bidders bid until supply meets demand to determine block prices in each band. Then the bidders can bid any combination of blocks less than or equal to what they bid at any point in the auction and give that package an overall price. The solver mechanism crunches all those packages to determine a solution that maximizes revenue for the government.