[smacktoward]

I'm no fan of Bill Barr, but I don't read this that way, no. It reads to me more like he's saying that from a planning perspective it's better to figure the worst thing that could happen and have a plan already developed that could handle that, rather than being caught by surprise and then having law and policy made in a mad, panicked rush.

(In other words, let's not do with cybersecurity policy what we did with counter-terrorism policy in the weeks after 9/11.)

[shawnz]

> have a plan already developed that could handle that

But... we do have a plan, which is to just not do it in spite of any crisis or whatever. He is misleadingly framing it here like we don't have the ability to backdoor encryption which has never been the problem.

He clearly states that what we need to be weary about is public opinion changing, which is basically like saying that we should just get ready to compromise our standards in preparation for the day where reactionary desire is able to overcome our "sober" thinking of the present, or else fear the government coming in and doing it sloppily and by force.

Clearly that's irrational. We should resist it now and we should resist it then too, for just the same reasons we resist it now. There's no technology issue here, just an ethical/political one.

[dmix]

San Bernardino also already happened. And it wasn't a big deal. They eventually got the phone broken, and there was nothing of value on it. But that's besides the point, it's an example of the type of thing they are talking about.

From my perspective life would not have been any meaningfully different either way if that phone stayed locked. I also can't image some future scenario where it makes such a big deal. What type of information is going to be on some laptop or smartphone that is so important it's worth compromising our general civil rights? There is almost always a hundred human errors around the crime already that they can piece it all together without godmode on every electronic device. A smartphone is rarely an all encompassing security mechanism for any big evil plot.

There is no 'backdoor' technology solution here that makes sense and they need to get used to it.

[redisman]

Barr's is really just the same reasoning used for the Patriot Act. Something really bad could happen unless everyone gives up X rights.

[basch]

isnt that a bad example though, because the counter-terrorism policy was already prewritten before the event. it wasnt a hasty reaction.

[smacktoward]

The hasty reaction was the panic that led lawmakers to grab for the most sweeping policy option they could find. What looks like prudence and caution in normal times looks like half-measures and cowardice in the heat of an emergency. Those policy proposals would have continued gathering dust forever, had not 9/11 provided a political moment that transformed things that everyone had considered faults into something that looked like virtues.

[inflatableDodo]

When a bad event happens, whatever laws you have already, no matter how strict they are, are always seen to be not enough, because people buy into the idea that if they were enough then the bad thing would not have happened. Putting into place strict laws before an event does not stop over-reaction after it.

[darawk]

That's how you're supposed to do things, though. You want to write the policies before the event, when you can think things through slowly and carefully. There's nothing wrong with this part of what he has to say...only the other parts.

[basch]

im saying 9/11 is an example of writing the policy ahead of time, and waiting for when you need it NOT throwing a proposal together after a stimulus.

9/11 is an example of what hes proposing, not a counter example.

[jimbob45]

This is how I interpreted it. It seems like a wise, level-headed approach.

[pdabbadabba]

Yes. But I think it's also a trick. He wants us to accept that we have not already had the debate. He and those who think like him will continue to use this line until they get an outcome they like.

And, by the way, we have had the debate--even, arguably, in the midst of a crisis. This was all over the news for weeks after the shooting in San Bernardino when the FBI told us it was vitally important to gain access to the perpetrator's phone. They didn't get their back door. Legislation was proposed that would have required it, but it was never adopted. (Though, in fairness, FBI did supposedly get a private company to break the encryption. But this was only after a very long delay and after all the public debate had largely dies down.)

[knd775]

Wise? You think encryption back doors are wise?

[smacktoward]

Encryption back doors are not wise, no.

Barr's point is that it's better to have that argument now, in a level-headed moment and with opportunities for all the relevant stakeholders to provide input, than it would be to have it in the middle of some dire emergency.

If you oppose back doors, I would think you would agree with him on this -- government tends to be delegated sweeping powers in emergencies, so it would be much harder to stop gov-friendly proposals like "back door all the things" in that kind of moment than it would be to stop them now.

[AnimalMuppet]

True. And even if we stop them now, we must be prepared to fight the battle again, because after a major incident, people will be screaming "See, we really need them! Give them to us so it won't happen again!" And we will have to explain, again, to people in panic, or people looking to exploit panic, that it still isn't a good idea, even after a major incident.

[windexh8er]

Agreed. It's better to have the conversation now because if we don't and the "event" does occur those who support encryption backdoors will use it as the basis of their argument in all possible manner.

"We must do something now, it's clear that we need backdoors because of X!" <- That's a much worse position to be in during a debate.