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by Scaevolus
2524 days ago
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Sia's seeds are ridiculous-- the 29 words provide 300 bits of entropy. 100 bits would be a sufficient security margin against brute forcing, assuming a modern memory-hard KDF like Argon2. With a 100 bit password, assuming every flop of the 1.8 exaflops of the Top500 supercomputers tested a new password, it would still take 25,000 years to crack. Key stretching should add at least 30 bits of security by taking a billion operations-- $ perf stat argon2 asdfasdf -id -m 16 -t 16 <<< asdf
Type: Argon2id
Iterations: 16
Memory: 65536 KiB
0.781 seconds
6,331,020,712 cycles # 4.021 GHz
13,467,211,117 instructions # 2.13 insn per cycle
Here's what 100 bits of security margin looks like with a more sophisticated scheme (abbrase): "Hope raised between unpleasant bellows. Devil rode sullenly, refugees waiting." => (first three letters) hopraibetunpbeldevrodsulrefwai. |
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