What fascinating language. "I'm using all my leverage to refuse" doesn't me "I refuse". I wonder how many Boeing engineers used all their leverage to refuse to compromise safety.
Some (large) companies have automated processes where you’re forced to book travel arrangements through intranet portals with a limited choice of suppliers.
I've worked for and know many people that work for very large (F500ish) companies, as well as the large consulting companies (Deloitte, Pwc, Accenture, etc), and booking your own flights/hotel is standard practice at all of the consulting companies and most of the others.
Interesting. I’ve never heard of a corporate department that books your travel. Sounds like a hassle. Any company I’ve been at, big or small, just has their policy parameters enforced by third party booking tools.
The very first passenger flight of the A320 was said to have been brought down by a software issue* and was effectively grounded by its launch being delayed. It isn't exactly the same situation, but its close enough to draw some parallels.
* - official reports blamed the pilot, but the pilot blamed the new software in the plane. Airbus was also accused of tampering with evidence to blame the pilot. These are also some parallels to Boeing's involvement in the initial MAX crash...
It should be noted that for the Air Show, the Airbus had most of it’s software safety features disabled and on top of that, the pilots flying the plane actually didn’t know the airport they were performing at. The latter is a major red flag.
In the end, software didn’t bring down that flight (as in, the software didn’t pitch the plane down into the ground). Disabled safety features stopped the plane from correcting a situation it would normally be protecting pilots from. And the pilots where unaware of any obstructions past the runway. Coupled with long spool up times for jet engine (any jet engine, I might add), and that flight was basically doomed once it was over the runway.
Mind you, I’m not trying to put the blame on anyone here, but to compare that crash with the recent MAX crashes is just not right. More comparable would be something like Qantas Flight 72, where the autopilot did in fact result in an uncommanded pitch down. Although the pilots recovered from that situation and the plane landed safely.
>In the end, software didn’t bring down that flight (as in, the software didn’t pitch the plane down into the ground)
>to compare that crash with the recent MAX crashes is just not right
>More comparable would be something like Qantas Flight 72, where the autopilot did in fact result in an uncommanded pitch down
These seem like very unnecessary distinctions. "In the end", the plane had software that was supposed to do one thing but failed to do that, resulting in the plane crashing. These are very apt and natural comparisons.